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The Law Is What It Is, but Is It Equitable? The
Law of Encroachments Where the Innocent,
Negligent, and Willful Are Treated the Same
OLIVIA L. WEEKS*
A landowner builds a house that encroaches two feet on his
neighbor's property. The encroachment involves very little land, but it
creates many issues for the respective landowners. In today's society,
where subdivisions are developed daily, there is an increasing potential for
encroachments due to innocent mistakes, negligence, or willfulness. When
an encroachment occurs, it would be terrific if the parties could negotiate a
fair solution, but this rarely happens. This is because the law
automatically places an encroaching landowner in an inferior bargaining
position. In North Carolina, courts will order the encroaching landowner
to remove the encroachment regardless of his intent. Therefore, the
encroaching landowner must meet the neighbor's demands for waiving a
mandatory injunction to compel removal or prepare to move the
encroaching portion of the structure.
This Article addresses the public policy and equitable issues sparked
by the encroachment of a permanent structure on an adjoining landowner's
property. It focuses on the equitable hardship doctrine, which is commonly
invoked by many jurisdictions in encroachment cases and applied when the
circumstances of a given case justif superseding the landowner's ordinary
remedy to an injunction-a doctrine which North Carolina has paid lip
service to but does not apply. The analysis in this Article leads to the
conclusion that in determining whether to grant an injunction, a court must
balance the equities by assessing the relative hardship of each party.
Application of the equitable hardship doctrine in encroachment cases will
prevent economic waste, the potential for extortion, and unnecessary
litigation, and create a just result for both parties.
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INTRODUCTION
North Carolina courts are unforgiving in decisions where permanent
structures have encroached on an adjoining landowner's property. The law
is simple: If the adjoining landowner requests a mandatory injunction to
compel removal, a court will grant it.' Everyone likes simple rules, but
should a simple rule continue to apply when its application creates greater
problems than it resolves? Knowing that courts will grant a mandatory
injunction to compel removal when permanent encroachments are at issue
promotes unnecessary litigation. It places plaintiffs in a strong bargaining
position and creates the potential for extortion. It results in waste if a
defendant must remove a portion of the encroaching structure. And, it
rarely deters the willful encroacher but severely punishes the innocent one.
Although these cases involve "mighty little" 2 in terms of the land
involved, they create a great deal of trouble for the parties and the courts.
This is because of two competing ideals. First, the law should not permit a
party "to take [the] land of another merely because he is willing to pay a
market price for it." 3  Second, courts should not sanction extortion and
economic waste by ordering destruction of a structure innocently built on
1. See, e.g., Young v. Lica, 576 S.E.2d 421, 425 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing and
remanding to determine if defendants encroached onto plaintiffs' easement and to render a
judgment based on law and precedent); Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665,
669 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding a mandatory injunction for removal was the proper
remedy for an apartment building encroaching one square foot onto adjoining landowner's
property); Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 304-05 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (granting a
mandatory injunction to compel removal of a house built partially on adjoining landowners'
property).
2. See Olivia L. Weeks, Comment, Much Ado About Mighty Little-North Carolina
and the Application of the Relative Hardship Doctrine to Encroachments of Permanent
Structures on the Property of Another, 12 CAMPBELL L. REv. 71, 72 & 72 n.14 (1989)
(quoting North v. Bunn, 38 S.E. 814, 814 (N.C. 1901) (involving an encroachment of the
corner of a house onto an adjoining landowner's property)). I originally wrote on this same
topic as a student in 1989. The "Much Ado About Mighty Little" Comment addresses the
relative hardship doctrine and its application to cases of permanent encroachment in North
Carolina prior to 1990. This Article addresses the same issue but through the lens of cases
after 1990.
3. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.10(4), at 816 (2d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES].
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the land of another.' Because these principles are inconsistent with each
other, courts should seek resolution through a balancing of the hardships
and equities.
Encroachments are characterized by the courts as renewing,
continuing, or permanent trespasses. As a general rule, North Carolina
courts apply the law of continuing trespass to encroachments of permanent
structures. 6 This allows plaintiff to seek a mandatory injunction to compel
removal, which will be issued if plaintiff can show there is no adequate
remedy at law and there is a real need for the injunction.7 This is not to be
confused with the election of remedies for unjust enrichment, which allows
the true landowner to elect to keep the structure and pay the builder the
amount by which the structure increased the value of his property or
demand the builder remove the structure and recover only actual damages
to the land.'
Equity is the body of principles that represents what is fair and right;9
therefore, in any equity action, the relative hardships to the parties and the
equities between them are to be considered.'o Upon balancing the equities
in encroachment cases, courts commonly deny relief to the aggrieved party
in favor of money damages if the encroachment was made innocently and
is slight compared to the injury to defendant if he has to remove it." An
injunction is not granted simply because of the advantage to plaintiff or
denied because of the convenience to defendant.1 2 The problem is one of
relative hardships, which requires balancing all of the equities involved,
4. Id. at 816-17.
5. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 57 (2000) [hereinafter DOBBS, LAW OF
TORTS].
6. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Rollinson, 192 S.E. 688 (N.C. 1937); Kinsland v. Kinsland, 125
S.E. 625 (N.C. 1924); Graham v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 768 S.E.2d 614 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2015); Adams Creek Assocs. v. Davis, 746 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013); Cornelius
v. Corry, No. COA06-107, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2135 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2006);
Young, 576 S.E.2d 421; Williams, 346 S.E.2d 665; Bishop, 311 S.E.2d 298; Terry v. Jim
Walter Corp., 175 S.E.2d 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970).
7. See Dan B. Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North Carolina Part II. Remedies for
Trespass, 47 N.C. L. REv. 334, 352-58 (1969) [hereinafter Dobbs, Remedies for Trespass].
8. See Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 146 S.E.2d 434, 439 (N.C. 1966). In Beacon,
defendant elected to keep a house mistakenly constructed on her property by plaintiff;
however, she refused to pay for the house or allow plaintiff to remove it. Id. at 435. The
court stated she could either allow plaintiff to remove the house or she could keep the house
and pay the amount by which the house increased the value of the property. Id. at 439.
9. Equity, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
10. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 816.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
12. Id.
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including the relative hardships to the parties, the interests of third parties,
and the interest of the general public.' 3 North Carolina courts discuss the
relative hardship doctrine but refuse to apply it in cases where a permanent
structure encroaches onto an adjoining landowner's property.14
Since 1984, North Carolina courts have relied on Bishop v. Reinhold"
as precedent for all cases involving permanent encroachments. Bishop
involved a home that was built partially on the plaintiffs' property.1 6 The
original tract of land was owned by defendants, who conveyed a portion of
the land to plaintiffs.' 7 While plaintiffs, a colonel in the Air Force and his
wife, were stationed in various locations, defendants built a new home
partially on plaintiffs' property." Plaintiffs sued for removal of the
house.1 9 At trial, the jury awarded damages, finding that defendants had
wrongfully trespassed on plaintiffs' property and the trespass was
continuing.20 Defendants appealed, and the appellate court stated-in order
to avoid multiple actions-the trial judge can order "equitable relief in the
form of a permanent injunction" which would allow a single recovery for
all damages.2 1 The court remanded the case to the trial court and ordered
the court to grant a mandatory injunction for the removal of the parts of
defendants' home encroaching onto plaintiffs' property.22 In this case, the
court did not discuss or even mention the relative hardship doctrine.
Although cases prior and subsequent to Bishop discuss the doctrine, courts
consistently follow the holding and rationale in Bishop whether the
encroachment was innocent, negligent, or willful. 23
This Article argues that the holding in Bishop should no longer be the
guiding star of the North Carolina courts. Instead, courts should apply the
equitable hardship doctrine in encroachment cases to determine whether a
mandatory injunction for removal is inequitable under the circumstances of
a given case. Part I discusses the characteristics of continuing and
permanent trespasses, how the characterization of each determines the
13. Id.
14. See Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., 342 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. 1986); Young v.
Lica, 576 S.E.2d 421 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d
665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
15. Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
16. Id. at 299.
17. Id. at 300.
18. Id. at 299.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 300 (quoting Conrad v. Jones, 228 S.E.2d 618, 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976)).
22. Id. at 305.
23. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
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remedies available to the parties, and the statute of limitation that applies to
each. Part II discusses the equitable remedy for encroachments of
permanent structures, a mandatory injunction to compel removal. It will
show that courts should balance the equities of the parties before issuing an
injunction. Part III gives an overview of the relative hardship doctrine,
how the doctrine is distinguishable from the betterments doctrine, and how
and why courts apply the relative hardship doctrine in other jurisdictions.
Part IV examines the rationale given by North Carolina courts for granting
mandatory injunctions without applying the relative hardship doctrine and
how subsequent cases apply that rationale. Finally, Part V discusses why
North Carolina courts should apply the equitable hardship doctrine and
how its application can prevent economic waste, potential extortion,
unnecessary litigation, and result in a just remedy for all parties involved.
An encroachment is an interference with or invasion of another
person's property.24 This Article limits encroachment to an intrusion by a
landowner onto the property of his neighbor by a permanent structure such
as a house, a shed, or a fence. This Article also presumes that the neighbor
entitled to a remedy holds superior title to the property in dispute.
I. CHARACTERIZATION OF TRESPASSES
Encroachment cases deal with "an ancient and simple tort-[an]
unauthorized intrusion . .. upon land owned or possessed by another." 25
Without an agreement or easement, an individual does not have the right to
build structures on his land that will extend beyond his boundaries and
26encroach onto his neighbor's property. At common law, the
encroachment is a trespass, 27 and failure to remove the encroachment
constitutes a continuing trespass.28
A. Permanent or Continuing?
A continuing trespass is a permanent invasion of the rights of
another.29 However, the determining factor in characterizing an
encroachment is not the physical permanence of a structure, but whether
24. See Encroachment, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
25. Dan B. Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North Carolina Part I The Substantive Law, 47
N.C. L. REv. 31, 31 (1968) [hereinafter Dobbs, Substantive Law].
26. 1 AM. JUR. 2DAdjoining Landowners § 112, at 1039 (2016).
27. Id.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
29. See DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, § 57, at 116-17.
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the court will abate the invasion of property rights.30 Courts characterize
encroachments as either continuing or permanent trespasses based partly
upon policy considerations. 3 1 To make the determination, courts consider
the physical permanence of the intrusion, the value of the encroachment to
the community, the relationship between the parties, and the status of each
party.32 After careful evaluation of these factors, a court will determine
whether the defendant should be allowed to continue the encroachment on
a single payment of damages or whether the plaintiff is entitled to a
mandatory injunction to compel removal.33 If the court will not abate the
trespass for reasons of judicial policy or cannot abate the trespass because
it is likely to continue in fact, the trespass will be characterized as
permanent.3 4 If, however, the court can and will abate the trespass because
of an election of remedies available to the injured party, the trespass will be
characterized as continuing.35
For example, a house encroaching on the land of another is a
permanent invasion of the landowner's property because the structure is
expected to stand indefinitely.36 The court, however, would likely abate the
trespass at the request of the landowner on the theory that allowing the
defendant to take the plaintiffs property is comparable to private eminent
domain.37 The trespass can continue only until the landowner exercises his
option to request a mandatory injunction to compel removal.38 Suppose,
however, that defendant built an electrical substation instead of a private
dwelling on plaintiffs land. In this scenario, the court would weigh the
industry's benefit to the community against the hardship plaintiff would
suffer if the structure is allowed to remain. If the court finds defendant's
benefit to the community outweighs plaintiffs hardship, it would allow the
structure to remain on plaintiffs land upon a single payment of damages. 39
The trespass then becomes legally and physically permanent and thus
characterized as a permanent trespass. 40
30. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.4, at 335-37 (1973)
[hereinafter DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES].
31. DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, § 57, at 117.
32. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES, supra note 30, § 5.4, at 337-38.
33. Id. at 337.
34. Id. at 340-41.
35. Id. at 342.
36. Id. at 339.
37. Id. at 340.
38. Id. at 336.
39. See id. at 340.
40. Id. at 341.
2017] 293
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A legally permanent trespass is one that is "likely to continue in fact
and guaranteed" to continue in law.4 ' The defendant either has statutory
powers of eminent domain or the public benefit generated by defendant's
enterprise outweighs the hardship to plaintiff.42 On the other hand, a house
or other type of private structure that encroaches upon another's land,
although "physically 'permanent,' is not legally permanent." 4 3 The injured
party can request damages and a mandatory injunction to compel removal
of the structure.44 As long as the injured landowner has the option of
seeking a mandatory injunction, courts can abate the trespass and will
characterize the trespass as continuing.45
B. Characterization Determines the Statute ofLimitations
One reason encroachment cases are so complex and often difficult to
understand is because an encroachment is a trespass the entire time it is
wrongfully on another's land.46 Each day the encroaching structure
47*remains, a new cause of action arises. Accordingly, successive causes of
action could accrue indefinitely.48 Theoretically, a plaintiff could sue more
than once for damages arising from the trespass. This would be
inconvenient and compel plaintiff to repeatedly harass defendant with a
multiplicity of suits. 4 9 Accordingly, most jurisdictions do not recognize
successive causes of action for a continuing trespass; there must be a single
41. Id.
42. Id. at 340.
43. Id. at 339.
44. Id. at 339-40.
45. Conrad v. Jones, 228 S.E.2d 618, 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) ("[P]1aintiffs' claim is
based upon 'continuing trespass,' and equitable relief in the form of a permanent injunction
is the proper remedy . . . to avoid a multiplicity of actions at law for damages." (citing
Young v. Pittman, 29 S.E.2d 551, 552 (N.C. 1944); Collins v. Freeland, 183 S.E.2d 831
(1971); Dobbs, Remedies for Trespass, supra note 7, at 359; H.H. Henry, Annotation,
Injunction Against Repeated or Continuing Trespasses on Real Property, 60 A.L.R.2d 310
(1958); J.A. Bock, Annotation, Right of Private Sewerage System Owner to Enjoin
Unauthorized Persons from Using Facilities, 76 A.L.R.2d 1329 (1961))).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 cmt. B (AM. LAW INST. 1965). See also
Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 300 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("A continuing trespass is a
peculiar animal in the law. The difficulty arises as to whether a plaintiff may maintain
successive actions . . . or whether he must recover all damages . . . in a single action. This
determination naturally controls the running of the statute of limitations." (citing WILLIAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 13 (4th ed. 1971))).
47. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 161 cmt. b.
48. DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, § 57, at 116.
49. See id.
294 [Vol. 39:2
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss2/4
THE LAW IS WHAT IT IS, BUT IS IT EQUITABLE?
recovery for all damages.5 0 North Carolina is among the jurisdictions that
require recovery of all damages for a continuing trespass in one action.5 '
This limitation to a single recovery for damages is another reason
encroachment cases are so complex. If there is a single recovery for
damages, there must be a definite point for determining when the statute of
limitations begins to run.52 Courts hold two very different views on this
issue. Some jurisdictions take the view that an encroachment constitutes a
permanent injury for which the statute of limitations begins to accrue at the
time of the original trespass. 53 Those courts will bar an action not brought
within the statutory period.54 Other jurisdictions take the view that an
encroachment, although permanent in nature, is a continuing trespass for
which successive causes of action may accrue indefinitely.5 North
Carolina courts follow the latter view.56
The North Carolina statute of limitations governing a continuing
trespass is three years. Damages incident to the original wrong must be
brought in a single action within the statutory period. In order to recover
damages for any acts committed after the initial trespass, plaintiff must
50. Id. at 115-16.
51. See Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 668 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
("North Carolina does not recognize successive causes of action for continuing trespass."
(citing Phillips v. Chesson, 58 S.E.2d 343 (N.C. 1950); Cherry v. Canal Co., 53 S.E. 138
(N.C. 1906); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 13 (3d ed. 1941))).
52. See V.G. Lewter, Annotation, When Does Cause ofAction Accrue, For Purposes of
Statute of Limitations, Against Action Based Upon Encroachment of Building or Other
Structure Upon Land of Another, 12 A.L.R.3d 1265 (1967) (explaining the various points at
which the statute may begin to run).
53. Id. at 1266.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1267.
56. Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 301 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("The wrongful
maintenance of a portion of the defendants' dwelling house on the plaintiffs' lot is a
separate and independent trespass each day it so remains and the three-year statute for
removal begins to run each day the encroaching structure remains upon the plaintiffs'
land.").
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(3) (2015) ("For trespass upon real property. When the
trespass is a continuing one, the action shall be commenced within three years from the
original trespass, and not thereafter."); see also Sample v. Roper Lumber Co., 63 S.E. 731,
732 (N.C. 1909) ("[T]he term [continuing trespass] could only refer to cases where a
wrongful act, being entire and complete, causes continuing damage, and was never intended
to apply when every successive act amounted to a distinct and separate renewal of the
wrong.").
58. Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 668 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
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plead and prove the increased or special damages.5 9 However, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent remedy is subject to the twenty-year statute of
limitations for adverse possession instead of the three-year statute of
limitations for continuing trespass. 60  The twenty-year statute applies
because a suit for permanent damages is brought for the purpose of
recovering the value of an easement, which the defendant could obtain
"only by grant, condemnation," or adverse possession.6' Awarding
permanent damages, therefore, is "equivalent to the acquisition of an
easement by condemnation" or private eminent domain.62
C. Characterization Determines the Remedy
North Carolina has "permitted permanent monetary damages only in
those situations involving quasi-public entities."6 3 A private party who
fails to bring suit for the original trespass within the statutory period and
fails to prove subsequent damages is barred from recovering monetary
damages caused by the trespass.6 4 If the defendant is entitled to demand
permanent damages in lieu of an injunction, he is forcing the plaintiff to
sell an interest in his land.65 If plaintiff is allowed to demand permanent
damages and is successful, he is forcing defendant to purchase an interest
in his land.66 In theory such an award would be analogous to condemnation
by a private citizen without the right of eminent domain, which the courts
will not sanction.67 Thus, plaintiffs only claim for relief is removal of the
structure that remains on his property.6 8 It is for this reason that courts will
grant a mandatory injunction to compel removal of an encroachment as a
matter of law; therefore, an action for permanent redress is not barred, only
an action for permanent damages.69
59. See Bishop, 311 S.E.2d at 302; see also Lightner v. City of Raleigh, 174 S.E. 272,
277 (N.C. 1934); Price v. Bunn, 187 S.E.2d 423, 426 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
60. Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 668 ("[P]1aintiff seeks a permanent remedy and is subject to
the twenty-year statute of limitations for adverse possession.").
61. Love v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 20 S.E.2d 337, 338 (N.C. 1942).
62. Id. (citing Geer v. Durham Water Co., 37 S.E. 474 (N.C. 1900); Query v. Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co., 101 S.E. 390 (N.C. 1919)).
63. Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
64. See Bishop, 311 S.E.2d at 302.
65. DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 5, § 57, at 115.
66. Id. at 115-16.
67. Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 668.
68. Bishop, 311 S.E.2d at 302.
69. See Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
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A plaintiff should seek an injunction as well as damages. If a court
denies damages, plaintiff still has an equitable remedy available to him.70
In North Carolina, a court that denies damages will, nevertheless, likely
grant a mandatory injunction to compel removal if requested.7 ' A
mandatory injunction is available to plaintiff until a prescriptive easement
or a fee simple interest is acquired by adverse possession.7 2
In sum, an encroachment, although permanent in nature, is a
continuing trespass that courts can and will abate. As long as the
encroachment remains wrongfully on another's land, it gives rise to a new
cause of action each day it remains, and a new statute of limitations begins
to run. In North Carolina, a plaintiff can bring only one trespass cause of
action for damages, must do so within the statutory three years, and must
plead and prove damages for subsequent harm for the three years prior to
the suit. In addition to damages, a plaintiff almost always seeks a
mandatory injunction to compel removal. If plaintiff seeks injunctive
relief, the North Carolina courts will grant a mandatory injunction to
compel removal as a matter of law, barred only by the twenty-year statute
for adverse possession.
II. MANDATORY INJUNCTION-THE EQUITABLE REMEDY
A mandatory injunction orders an affirmative act or mandates a
specified course of conduct.73 It is an equitable remedy issued at the
discretion of the court only under certain conditions and after careful
consideration of specific factors.74 In encroachment cases, mandatory
injunctions compel removal of permanent structures partially built on the
land of another.75 This Section addresses when, to whom, and under what
conditions the court will issue a mandatory injunction to compel removal.
70. See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES, supra note 30, § 5.4, at 341-43.
71. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Rollinson, 192 S.E. 688, 690 (N.C. 1937) (deeming a wharf a
continuous trespass on plaintiffs' riparian rights, entitling plaintiffs to mandatory
injunction); Conrad v. Jones, 228 S.E.2d 618 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) ("[P]laintiffs' claim is
based upon 'continuing trespass,' and equitable relief in the form of a permanent injunction
is the proper remedy in such cases in order to avoid a multiplicity of actions at law for
damages." (citing Young v. Pittman, 29 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1944); Collins v. Freeland, 183
S.E.2d 831 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971); Dobbs, Remedies for Trespass, supra note 7, at 359;
Henry, supra note 45; Bock, supra note 45)).
72. See Love v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 20 S.E.2d 337, 338 (N.C. 1942) (citing Teeter v.
Postal Tel. Co., 90 S.E. 941, 941 (N.C. 1916)); Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 668; Bishop, 311
S.E.2d at 301.
73. Mandatory Injunction, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
74. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(3), at 807-08.
75. Id. § 5.10(4), at 817.
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A. In General
"A mandatory injunction is one that compels the defendant to restore
things to their former condition, and virtually directs him to perform an
act." 7 6 Ordinarily, an injunction will issue in encroachment cases where
the plaintiff shows a genuine need, and there is no genuine need to deny the
*77issuance.
Historically, courts have been reluctant to issue an injunction against a
trespass. 8 If there was an adequate remedy at law, an injunction would not
issue.7 9 Although this rule is still current, courts often find the remedies at
law inadequate and will restrain the trespass if a plaintiff has a genuine
need for the injunction.so Encroachments classified as continuing
trespasses come within this exception to the rule. When a continuing
trespass is at issue, resorting to a remedy at law may require a multiplicity
of suits," and the nature of the injury makes it difficult to ascertain the
amount of damages.8 2 For these reasons, courts frequently deem a remedy
at law inadequate.8 3
However, courts generally will not issue a permanent injunction to
determine the disputed question of title.8 4 Moreover, equity should not and
does not transfer possession by injunctive relief because a change of
possession changes the burden of proving title in a later ejectment action.85
North Carolina courts have been extremely reluctant to issue injunctions to
try title or affect possession. Whenever possession has been an issue or a
76. Keys v. Alligood, 100 S.E. 113, 114 (N.C. 1919) (quoting GEORGE TUCKER
BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 400, at 634 (9th ed. 1915)).
77. Dobbs, Remedies for Trespass, supra note 7, at 351-52.
78. Id. at 352.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Conrad v. Jones, 228 S.E.2d 618, 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (holding a permanent
injunction to be the proper form of equitable relief for plaintiffs' claim of a "continuing
trespass" to avoid multiple legal actions for damages (citing Young v. Pittman, 29 S.E.2d
551 (N.C. 1944); Collins v. Freeland, 183 S.E.2d 831 (1971); Dobbs, Remedies for
Trespass, supra note 7, at 359; Henry, supra note 45, at 314; Bock, supra note 45)).
82. Henry, supra note 45, at 314.
83. See, e.g., id.; see also Collins, 183 S.E.2d at 832.
84. Young, 29 S.E.2d at 552 (citing Black v. Jackson, 177 U.S. 349 (1900))
(underscoring that ordinarily a court of equity will not grant an injunction to determine a
disputed question of title to land; injunction is only proper after a final determination of the
issues of fact).
85. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(3), at 811.
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boundary line has been in dispute, the appellate courts have remanded the
case to the trial court for determination of ownership.86
B. Adequacy of a Legal Remedy
In encroachment cases, the majority view is that the landowner does
not have an adequate remedy at law; therefore, equity has jurisdiction. 7
Accordingly, a mandatory injunction to compel removal is a proper remedy
for a landowner to invoke against an adjoining landowner. This is
especially true if the continuing trespass will ripen into an easement or
prescriptive right." To invoke this remedy, the plaintiff must plead facts
which, if proved, will establish that the threatened injury is irreparable, a
resort to law would result in a multiplicity of law suits, or another ground
for equitable relief exists.89 If plaintiff successfully pleads and proves his
case, a mandatory injunction will issue to protect the landowner's interest
in the use and enjoyment of his land.90
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in English v. Holden Beach
Realty Corp. set forth the established principles courts use to determine
adequacy of a remedy at law with respect to an action for a mandatory
injunction.91 Plaintiffs commenced an action alleging defendant, a
developer, trespassed on their lands by laying out and grading a road, and
they requested damages and a mandatory injunction to compel removal of
the road.92  In addressing defendant's contention that a mandatory
injunction was improper, the court stated that "[e]quitable relief in the form
of a mandatory injunction will lie in cases of continuing trespass in order to
avoid a multiplicity of actions at law for damages." 93 The court went on to
state that "[i]njunction is a proper remedy for relief against continuing
trespass either where perpetual injunction is sought in an independent
86. See, e.g., English v. Holden Beach Realty Corp., 254 S.E.2d 223, 233 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1979) ("Clearly, plaintiffs will not be entitled to the injunction until questions of
boundary, title and possession have been resolved."); Conrad, 228 S.E.2d at 619 ("[T]here
can be no determination as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief until there
has been a finding as to the nature and extent of plaintiffs' interest . . . .").
87. L.C. Warden, Annotation, Mandatory Injunction to Compel Removal of
Encroachments by Adjoining Landowner, 28 A.L.R.2d 679, 685 (1953).
88. Henry, supra note 45, at 334-35.
89. Id. at 316.
90. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 815-16.
91. English, 254 S.E.2d at 233.
92. Id. at 226-27.
93. Id. at 233 (citing Conrad v. Jones, 228 S.E.2d 618 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976); Collins v.
Freeland, 183 S.E.2d 831 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971); Young v. Pittman, 29 S.E.2d 551 (N.C.
1944); 7 STRONG'S N.C. INDEX 3D, Injunctions § 7.1, at 240).
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action or where . .. the injunction is ancillary to an action in which the title
to land or the right to its possession is at issue."94 In addition, the court
stated that "injunctive relief is not a matter of right" but is issued or denied
at the discretion of the court.95
C. Factors Determining Issuance of a Mandatory Injunction
This Section discusses the factors considered by the courts in granting
or denying a mandatory injunction. It will discuss the conduct of both the
defendant and the plaintiff and the extent of the trespass. But first, this
Section discusses the threshold factor of the adequacy of a legal remedy.
In a majority of jurisdictions, the prevailing factor is the adequacy or
inadequacy of a legal remedy.9 6 Courts in these jurisdictions generally hold
that a landowner does not have an adequate remedy at law because
damages are difficult to determine and would require a multiplicity of
lawsuits. 97 Moreover, if defendant's building remains on the plaintiffs
land long enough, the defendant may acquire title by adverse possession.9 8
If an award of monetary damages were granted for a permanent
encroachment, it would be comparable to condemnation by a private citizen
without the right of eminent domain.99 In jurisdictions that hold monetary
damages to be adequate, the courts would likely "assess damages on a
permanent basis and award the landowner the [lost] value of his property"
in lieu of allowing the landowner to bring successive causes of action.' 00
There is consensus "that a mandatory injunction should issue,
regardless of the . . . relative hardship[s]" of the parties, when the
encroachment is willful or intentional.'0 ' One who intentionally or
willfully encroaches on another's land does so at his own peril.1 02 "Where
there is a deliberate, unlawful, and inexcusable invasion, by one man, of
another's land . . . and there has been neither acquiescence nor delay in
applying to [the] court for relief, . . . [the court will issue] a mandatory
94. Id. (citing Jackson v. Jernigan, 5 S.E.2d 143 (N.C. 1939)).
95. Id. (quoting 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 14, at 768 (1978)).
96. Adjoining Landowners, supra note 26, § 123.
97. See, e.g., Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 668 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986).
98. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 818.
99. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES, supra note 30, § 5.4, at 340.
100. Dobbs, Remedies for Trespass, supra note 7, at 348.
101. Warden, supra note 87, at 685; see also Adjoining Landowners, supra note 26,
§ 125.
102. Warden, supra note 87, at 685.
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injunction against a continuance of [a] trespass."1 03 This reasoning extends
to cases where defendant had notice he was encroaching on another's
land.1 04 A defendant who continues to erect a structure on plaintiffs land
after receiving notice the building is on the wrong property obviously takes
a major risk.1o' Any actual notice, written or oral, will invoke the rule; a
court-issued notice is not required.1 06
On the other hand, if a defendant can show that plaintiff consented to
the encroachment, the court will deny a mandatory injunction to compel
removal. 0 7 The landowner may provide express or implied consent.0 s For
example, suppose a landowner observes his neighbor building a garage that
extends a fraction of a foot over the boundary line. The parties are good
friends, so the landowner tells the neighbor the garage may remain as it is.
In that case, the landowner has expressly consented to the encroachment.
Suppose, however, the landowner tells the neighbor of the encroachment
but does not request removal. The neighbor can infer from the landowner's
actions that the landowner has given implied consent for the neighbor to
continue the trespass. 109
Another factor considered is the conduct of plaintiff. One of the
principles of equity is that one who seeks equity must come before the
court with clean hands."10 For example, suppose plaintiff and defendant
owned adjoining properties, and each parcel of land was subject to an
easement for ingress and egress. Defendant built a fence that was slightly
crooked and encroached upon the land subject to the easement in several
places. Plaintiff passed by the construction each day but made no
objections to the location of the fence. After construction was complete,
plaintiff brought an action to compel removal of the encroaching portions
of the fence. However, before trial, defendant produced evidence that
103. Leaksville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 112 S.E. 24, 25 (N.C.
1922) (quoting Broome v. N.Y. & N.J. Tel. Co., 7 A. 851, 852 (N.J. Ch. 1887)).
104. Adjoining Landowners, supra note 26, § 125.
105. Warden, supra note 87, at 685.
106. See, e.g., Bunn Lake Prop. Owner's Ass'n v. Setzer, 560 S.E.2d 576 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002); Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. James, 294 S.E.2d 23 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); Schell v. Rice,
246 S.E.2d 61 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
107. Warden, supra note 87, at 710.
108. Adjoining Landowners, supra note 26, § 126.
109. See id.
110. Allen v. Wilmington & W.R. Co., 11 S.E. 826, 828 (N.C. 1890) (Avery, J.,
concurring) ("Where it has been held that the conduct of a person was such as to prevent
him, in a court of conscience, from seeking a remedy to which he would have been
entitled ... the ruling has rested on the maxim that 'he who seeks equity must do equity,
and he who comes into a court of equity must come with clean hands."' (quoting 2 JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 816 (1881))).
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plaintiffs fence also encroached several inches on the land subject to the
easement. Plaintiff was aware of this fact, but defendant had no knowledge
of the encroachment. In this case, the court would deny a mandatory
injunction because plaintiff comes before the court with unclean hands."'
One must do equity to seek equity, and plaintiff, who is also an obstructer
of the easement, did not come into the court with clean hands and did not
act equitably.112
In addition, some jurisdictions consider the extent of a trespass in
determining whether an injunction should issue.1 3  These jurisdictions
apply the "de minimis" rule when the encroachment is minor and defendant
acted in good faith." 4 The rule is based on the maxim "de minimis non
curat lex: the law is not concerned with trifles."" A minority of courts
applies the de minimis rule.11 6  North Carolina is not one of these
jurisdictions.1
Before an injunction will issue, courts consider each of the factors and
determine whether equity entitles the complainant to relief Once the court
evaluates the factors, it will grant or deny an injunction at its discretion.
Except where title is an issue, a majority of jurisdictions will issue an
injunction without a great deal of reluctance.
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 940 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
112. See Scuorzo v. Infantino, 146 A. 326, 327 (N.J. Ch. 1929) (applying the clean hands
doctrine to hold plaintiff, who constructed a curb five inches in width onto a common
driveway, was not entitled to a mandatory injunction requiring defendant to remove a brick
wall which encroached to a lesser extent on the opposite side of the driveway).
113. See, e.g., Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 596 (Colo. 1951) (en banc)
(finding mandatory injunction unwarranted to compel removal of building footings which
encroached on plaintiffs' land between 2 to 3.5 inches); Serrano v. Brosnan, No. 14 MISC
482350 (HPS), 2016 WL 5900082, at *1 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 11, 2016) (finding de minimis
a stone wall representing a less-than-one-inch encroachment); Averaimo v. Tavares, 941
N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (finding de minimis a fence that measured one
foot at the back of the property and four inches on other portions of the property).
114. Warden, supra note 87, at 709.
115. Id. at 709 n.7
116. See, e.g., Capodilupo v. Vozzella, 704 N.E.2d 534 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (refusing
to compel removal of 4.8-inch encroachment by walls); Gelderloos v. Duke, 88 P.3d 814
(Mont. 2004) (holding foundation encroachment to be de minimis and refusing to compel
removal of house); Zhuang Li Cai v. Uddin, 871 N.Y.S.2d 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
(holding encroachment to be de minimis and denying plaintiffs request to compel removal
of defendant's fence posts encroaching approximately two inches onto plaintiff's property).
117. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Rollinson, 192 S.E. 688 (N.C. 1937) (granting plaintiffs a
mandatory injunction to compel removal of wharf that extended 3.8 feet onto plaintiffs'
riparian rights); Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
(requiring removal of defendant's two-story apartment building that encroached one square
foot on plaintiff's property).
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D. Policy Considerations
This Section addresses the property rights of a landowner and why the
court will issue a mandatory injunction to protect these rights. It will
discuss the right of the landowner to exclusive possession and quiet
enjoyment of his property. It will then discuss the landowner's right to
have his property free from encumbrances and the right to the physical
integrity of his property.
The common law considers property unique." 8 No two parcels of
land are identical; therefore, one parcel of land cannot be substituted for
another.119 When a seller breaches a contract for the sale of land, the buyer
can request, and the court will enforce, the specific performance of the
contract.1 2 0 The court will grant injunctive relief for the same reasons it
will grant specific performance of a contract to purchase land-to protect
the peculiar nature of the right and subject matter invaded.121 The right
invaded is the right to exclusive possession and quiet enjoyment of land;
the subject matter invaded is the land itself.1 2 2 A court bases its rationale
for granting injunctive relief on policy considerations, which reflect the
unique quality of land, the possession of the land, and the vested rights of
ownership.1 23
Injunctive relief will issue against an encroachment because a money
judgment cannot protect the landowner's right to exclusive possession and
quiet enjoyment of his land.1 24 The interest at issue in encroachment cases
is not financial; it is an interest in these valuable property rights.1 25
Monetary damages cannot replace or restore these interests when the
invasion is permanent in nature and will continue unless abated.
An owner of land has the right to keep his property free from
encumbrances and to maintain the physical integrity of the land.1 26 An
encroachment violates the right to have property free from encumbrances
from its outset, and the encumbrance will remain unless abated.1 2 7 The
118. Nancy Perkins Spyke, What's Land Got to Do with It?: Rhetoric and Indeterminacy
in Land's Favored Legal Status, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 387, 387 (2003).
119. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.5, at 738
(3d ed. 2000).
120. Id.
121. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(3), at 807.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Dobbs, Remedies for Trespass, supra note 7, at 354.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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encroachment also violates the physical integrity of the land, and, if
allowed to continue, it can cause irreparable damage to the property. For
these reasons, monetary damages are not an adequate remedy; they can
neither free the land from encumbrances nor restore the physical integrity
of the property. "Defendants must attain its [sic] ends . . . in accordance
with the age-old maxim that a man must use his own property in such a
way as not to injure the rights of others, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non
Icedas."128 A structure that encroaches on the land of another violates the
true landowner's legal right of ownership, and the statute of limitations for
adverse possession runs against the original trespass.1 2 9 Protection of the
landowner's right is based upon the danger that a continuing encroachment
can result in title to the land vesting in defendant by adverse possession or
an easement by prescription.1 30 The courts will grant injunctive relief to
prevent this possibility from becoming a reality.131
Moreover, a private citizen does not have the power of eminent
domain; he cannot take property simply because he needs or wants it.132 If
a court allows a defendant to continue an encroachment upon a single
payment of damages, a private eminent domain would be sanctioned.1 33
Unless injunctive relief is available, a landowner can become prey to
anyone who wants the landowner's land for whatever reason.
When the court issues a mandatory injunction to compel removal, it
forces the trespassing party to remove the encroachment at his or her own
expense. 134 The law should not force an aggrieved landowner to resort to
self-help to rid land of encroachments, which reduce the value of the land
and place a cloud on its title. In addition, the law should not force a
landowner to incur the expense of removal; instead, it should place the
burden of removal on the party who created the wrong.
128. Cook v. Town of Mebane, 131 S.E. 407, 409 (N.C. 1926) (quoting Rhyne v. Flint
Mfg. Co., 109 S.E. 376, 378 (N.C. 1921)).
129. Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 301 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Love v.
Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 20 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. 1942)).
130. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 815-16; see, e.g., Brittain v.
Correll, 335 S.E.2d 513 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
131. For a complete discussion, see supra Section I.B.
132. Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 668 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
133. McCoy v. Peach, 251 S.E.2d 881, 884 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (deeming it an
impermissible private right of eminent domain to force defendant to sell to plaintiff the land
on which plaintiff had encroached).
134. See, e.g., Mathis v. Hoffman, 711 S.E.2d 825, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011); Williams,
346 S.E.2d at 669; Bishop, 311 S.E.2d at 305; Terry v. Jim Walter Corp., 175 S.E.2d 354
(N.C. Ct. App. 1970).
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In sum, courts grant a mandatory injunction to compel removal in
encroachment cases to protect property rights.1 3 5 Monetary damages are
inadequate because they expose the landowner to the risk of losing his
property either through private eminent domain or adverse possession.1 36
Courts will not grant injunctive relief to affect transfer of possession;
neither will the courts deny injunctive relief if it will affect the landowner's
right of possession.1 3 7
III. RELATIVE HARDSHIP DOCTRINE
Before deciding whether to grant or deny an injunction-"the most
oppressive of equitable remedies"1 3 8-the court should weigh the equities
and hardships of the parties.1 39 These include "the nature of the interests
affected, and the relative proportion of the interests of each that will be lost
by whichever course of action is taken."1 40
Consider the following example: Defendant purchased his home from
a contractor in 2006; the final sale price of the home and property was over
$600,000.141 Prior to closing, the contractor provided defendant with a
2006 property survey; the survey did not show any anomalies,
encroachments, or other violations on the property.1 4 2 In 2010, plaintiff, a
power company, sent defendant a letter alleging that a portion of
defendant's house encroached onto an easement owned by plaintiff and
demanding that defendant remove the encroaching portion of his
residence. 143 When defendant did not take any action, plaintiff sued
defendant for encroachment upon its easement. 144 The trial court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was
barred by the statute of limitations.1 4 5 After plaintiff appealed, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.1 4 6 In June 2016, the North Carolina
135. See Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 665.
136. Id. at 668 (citing Bishop, 311 S.E.2d 298).
137. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, §5.10(4), at 816.
138. David E. Cole, Note, Judicial Discretion and the "Sunk Costs" Strategy of
Government Agencies, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 689, 713 (2003).
139. HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY § 140, at 248 (1936).
140. Id.
141. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 789 S.E.2d 445, 446-47 (N.C. 2016).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 447.
144. Id.
145. Id. (barring plaintiffs claim by applying a six-year statute of limitations for injury
to any incorporeal hereditament).
146. Id. (citing Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 766 S.E.2d 354 (N.C. Ct. App.
2014)).
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Supreme Court granted discretionary review and reversed the decision of
the court of appeals; the case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.1 4 7
The question now becomes: What happens to defendant's residence?
Consider the relative proportion of each party's interest lost by whichever
course of action the court takes. If the trial court denies an injunction, the
use of plaintiff's property will be only slightly less valuable but, if the court
grants an injunction, the ruling would prevent the defendant from using his
property for its only valuable purpose. Does the benefit to plaintiff
outweigh the hardship brought on defendant? Plaintiffs benefit is that it
will be able to maintain the easement free of structural encroachments.
Defendant, on the other hand, may have to remove the house since the
encroachment is structural and includes part of the foundation.1 48
Simple justice requires balancing the equities of the parties before
deciding whether a mandatory injunction to compel removal should
issue.1 4 9  This Section will give an overview of the relative hardship
doctrine, also known as balancing of the equities.5 o Mistakenly, some
authorities have indicated that the legislature has codified the relative
hardship doctrine as it applies to permanent encroachments in North
Carolina under the betterments statute. '5  This Section will address this
inaccuracy before discussing how jurisdictions outside of North Carolina
have applied the relative hardship doctrine.
A. Balancing the Equities
Injunctions issue not as "a matter of right"; the grant or refusal rests in
the court's discretion.1 5 2 The prevailing approach in this type of action is to
"balance the relative hardships and equities [of the parties] and to grant or
deny the injunction as the balance" indicates.1 5 3 This doctrine is best stated
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
147. Id. at 447, 449 (holding that the twenty-year statute of limitations for adverse
possession, not the six-year statute of limitations for incorporeal hereditaments, applied
where the easement was both an incorporeal hereditament and real property).
148. See, e.g., Phillip Bantz, Limitation for Encroachment Suit is 20, Not Six, Years,
N.C. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 12, 2016, at 2.
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
150. See Weeks, supra note 2, at 74-85 for an in-depth discussion of the relative
hardship doctrine.
151. See infra Section III.B.
152. English v. Holden Beach Realty Corp., 254 S.E.2d 223, 233 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)
(quoting 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 14, at 768 (1978)).
153. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 816.
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When a plaintiff proves that a tort has been committed or is threatened and
shows that other remedies will not make him whole, an injunction is not to
be issued as a matter of course. Elementary justice requires consideration
of the hardship the defendant would be caused by an injunction as
compared with the hardship the plaintiff would suffer if the injunction
should be refused. Though the expression "balance of convenience" is
sometimes used to designate the weighing process here involved, it does
not state the proper test. The term suggests a nice measurement of relative
advantages and a denial of the injunction if the scales tip in the defendant's
favor. The law does not grant an injunction merely because of the
advantage that the plaintiff might reap from it, and it does not refuse an
injunction merely because of the convenience that the refusal might afford
the defendant. The problem is more complex than that. It cannot be
summed up in any phrase less elastic than "relative hardship."1 54
When the encroachment of a permanent structure is involved, the
problem is complex, and it poses special problems for the courts. 5 5 If the
court denies an injunction, the landowner is stuck with the encroacher's
structure partially on his property and must accept damages instead of an
injunction to compel removal.1 56 If the court grants a mandatory injunction
to compel removal, the encroacher must remove the encroachment, and the
landowner will once again have complete possession of his property. 5 7 At
what point does a court determine the proper remedy, and what policies and
other factors are considered by the court in its decision making process?
1. Policy Considerations
When permanent encroachments are involved, the courts are guided
by two fundamental considerations in balancing the equities between the
parties. 5  First, just because a party can pay market price for land, he
should not be allowed to take another party's land.1 5 9 This would amount
to a private taking equivalent to eminent domain.1 6 0 Second, demolishing a
structure may result in the undesirable results of extortion or economic
waste.161 If tearing down a portion of a large structure is the only way the
encroachment can be removed, but the harm to the adjoining landowner is
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 cmt. a; see generally Jared A. Goldstein,
Equitable Balancing in the Age ofStatutes, 96 VA. L. REv. 485, 504 n.78 (2010).
155. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 815.
156. Id. at 816.
157. Jd
158. Md
159. Md
160. Md
161. d.
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small, the defendant is placed in an untenable position. These principles
are inconsistent with each other and, as such, courts should instead balance
the equities and hardships of each party.1 6 2
A classic illustration of these competing considerations is found in
Williams v. South & South Rentals, Inc.1 63  Defendant's two-story
apartment building crossed plaintiffs property by approximately one
foot.1 64  When defendant learned of the encroachment, he informed
plaintiff, who offered to sell defendant the land, one-fourth to one-third
acre of unusable creek bed, for a sum in excess of $45,000.165 Defendant
refused to pay the exorbitant amount, and plaintiff brought an action
demanding defendant remove the encroaching portion of his building.1 66
The North Carolina Court of Appeals remanded the case to the superior
court to issue the mandatory injunction.1 67
If the court had denied the injunction, it would have granted a license
to private eminent domain,1 68 yet, in granting the injunction, the court
sanctioned the possibility of extortion and economic waste.1 6 9 Defendant
was forced to remove the portion of his building encroaching onto
plaintiffs land or pay plaintiff his asking price to waive the mandatory
injunction. Granted, the law should not allow an individual to take
another's land simply because he is willing to pay for it.17 0 This is a type of
private eminent domain and to allow it would set an unwise precedent.' 7 '
Setting such a precedent could lead land developers and others to
intentionally encroach on adjoining land thinking they could acquire the
land by paying fair market value.1 7 2 On the other hand, should a defendant
who innocently encroaches one foot onto plaintiffs property suffer the
hardships resulting from a mandatory injunction to compel removal when
162. Id
163. Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
164. Id at 667.
165. Id at 666.
166. Id
167. Id at 669.
168. Id at 668.
169. See AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 985 P.2d 757, 764 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 21
P.3d 24 (N.M. 2001) ("If [defendant does] not want to 'waste' [his] investment, then as this
Court has said in the past under somewhat analogous circumstances, 'nothing forbids
[defendant] from negotiating with [plaintiff] to waive its right to compel removal of the
building.' The fact that a 'court injunction provides [plaintiff] with a very strong bargaining
position is no grounds [to deny an injunction]." (citation omitted) (quoting Cafeteria
Operators, L.P. v. Coronado-Santa Fe Assocs., 952 P.2d 435, 443 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997))).
170. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 816.
171. Id
172. See id.
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he had no intention of taking land that was not his? Balancing the equities
of the parties should result in a more equitable solution for both parties.
The second policy consideration is that courts should not sanction
extortion.1 7 3  Certainly, the judicial system should not pave the path
enabling extortion. The nature of continuing trespasses, and the options
available to plaintiff, place the defendant in an untenable position: caught
between the devil and the deep blue sea. The fact remains that regardless
of his intentions, the defendant is the offender, and no one is more aware of
this than plaintiff. Under these circumstances, it is reasonably certain
plaintiff will be willing to compromise for an extortionate figure when
defendant's only alternative is the threat of a court-issued injunction to
compel removal of his building.1 74
In addition, the economic waste that may result from destroying a
structure is not a desired result. 7 1 Injunctive relief, in most cases, will
result in the destruction of a portion of defendant's building, and the harm
to plaintiff would be quite small in comparison.1 76 Therefore, a "mandatory
injunction [will result in] economic waste or else put the plaintiff in
position to demand an unconscionably high price to let the building stay in
place." 7 7 Neither option is ideal for the innocent defendant.
Punishing the encroacher is one of the underlying reasons for granting
a mandatory injunction. 7 s One who is responsible for the wrong should
not escape punishment simply because he is willing and capable of paying
for his wrongdoing.1 7 9 A mandatory injunction to compel removal not only
vindicates the plaintiff, but it punishes the defendant, as well.so Punishing
the defendant serves two purposes. Specific to the case, the defendant must
pay for the wrong he has done, and, more broadly, a general deterrent of
intentional encroachments results.'' In jurisdictions that do not apply the
equitable hardship doctrine, the punishment is the same for both the
intentional and accidental encroacher. 8 2  An innocent defendant must
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 666 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986).
175. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 816.
176. See AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 21 P.3d 24, 29 (N.M. 2001) (holding that hardship
to the adjoining landowner did not require removal).
177. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 816.
178. See W. Page Keeton & Clarence Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18
TEX. L. REv. 412, 415 (1940).
179. See id. at 416; DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 816.
180. Keeton & Morris, supra note 178, at 415.
181. Id. at 417.
182. See id. at 413.
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remove the encroachment and pay any damages caused by the removal.
His innocent mistake will be severely punished, and the deterrent factor
will serve no useful purpose. Ignoring the difference between intentional
wrongdoing and innocent mistakes is bad policy.
In any encroachment case, protection of property rights will always be
a policy consideration. 8 3 If courts apply the relative hardship doctrine to
innocent encroachments, the encroacher must still overcome this
consideration, which is more concerned with the protection of the
landowner's property rights than the rights of the encroacher.18 4
2. Equities Considered by the Courts
Courts will deny injunctive relief against an encroaching landowner if
the harm that would result from a mandatory injunction to compel removal
is disproportionate to the plaintiff's injury.' Often when a court grants an
injunction, the harm done to the encroaching landowner is much greater
than the benefit gained by the plaintiff; therefore, whenever possible "the
greater harm will be not caused for the protection of the lesser benefit."18 6
If the disproportion between the harm to the encroaching landowner and
the plaintiff is the only reason for denying plaintiff relief, "the
disproportion must be one of considerable magnitude." 8 7  For example,
suppose defendant builds a toolshed that encroaches a few feet on
plaintiff's land. If ordered to remove the encroachment, defendant's cost is
very little to give the plaintiff the relief he needs. Therefore, the harm to
defendant is not disproportionate to the plaintiffs benefit. But, suppose
that instead of building a shed, defendant builds a house a fraction of a foot
over his boundary line. In this case, the cost of removal is considerable
without conferring a significant benefit to plaintiff. Here, the disproportion
between the harm and benefit is significant. However, the disproportion
between the harm and benefit to the parties is rarely the only basis for
denying relief.'
In most cases, courts evaluate multiple factors before granting or
denying an injunction.'8 9 The threshold factor considered by the court is
the defendant's conduct. "Where the encroachment is deliberate and
183. See MCCLNTOCK, supra note 139, § 140.
184. See, e.g., AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welbom, 21 P.3d 24, 27-29 (N.M. 2001).
185. RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 563 (AM. LAW INST. 1944).
186. Id. § 563 cmt. a (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 (AM. LAW INST.
1979)).
187. Id. § 563 cmt. c.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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constitutes a willful and intentional taking of another's land, equity may
well require its restoration regardless" of the relative hardships of the
parties.1 90  "[W]here the encroachment was in good faith, ... the court
should weigh the circumstances so that it shall not act oppressively."191
Thus, the defendant is essentially treated as the wrongdoer in an
encroachment case whether his conduct is innocent or intentional.1 92 The
defendant was either ignorant of the situation, knew but did not care, or
made an honest mistake.1 93  Before the relative hardship doctrine will
apply, the court must find the defendant made an innocent mistake.1 94 An
innocent mistake can be made by one who does not have notice he is
invading another's property rights or by one who had notice but made a
"good faith error" that caused slight damage to another's property.19' The
burden is upon the defendant to prove the encroachment was innocent;
however, in the case of non-willfulness, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff.1 9 6 If the defendant successfully proves his innocence, he must
then prove that the intrusion on plaintiffs property is slight and does not
impair the plaintiffs enjoyment of his property.1 9 7  It is only after the
defendant meets his burden of proof that the court will balance all of the
equities between the parties before issuing or denying an injunction. 198
The plaintiffs conduct, the property interest affected, and the relative
interest of each party are additional factors considered by the court.199
Although the court "must consider the peculiar equities of the case,"200
190. Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo. 1951) (citing 5 JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 508 (3d ed. 1905)).
191. Id. (citing POMEROY, supra note 190, § 508).
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
193. See id.
194. See Norfolk S. R. Co. v. Stricklin, 264 F. 546, 574 (E.D.N.C. 1920) ("Without
laying down any absolute rule, it is of great importance to see if defendant knew he was
doing wrong and was taking his chances about being disturbed in doing it." (quoting Smith
v. Smith, 20 L.R. 500 (1875))).
195. Jeffrey C. Palkovitz, Note, Comparative Hardship Doctrine Applied in Easement
Action, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 709,711 (1981).
196. Id. An innocent mistake carries a higher standard of proof than non-willfulness.
"Non-willfulness and innocence do not have precisely the same connotation." Id.
Something may be non-willful without being innocent, but defendant's showing of
non-willfulness shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff. Id. To prove innocence,
defendant must prove he did not know of plaintiffs rights, or if he had notice, "he made a
good faith error which resulted in slight interference with plaintiff's rights." Id.
197. Id. at 713.
198. Id. at 713-14.
199. HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 144 (2d ed.
1948).
200. Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 594-95 (Colo. 1951).
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there is "no specific and universally-accepted rule as to encroachments." 2 0 1
A court may deny a request for an injunction if the encroachment caused
minimal damage to the plaintiff or where the expense and difficulty of
removal by the defendant would be disproportionate to plaintiffs
inconvenience if the encroachment remained.20 2 However, other courts
take the position that the amount of damage suffered by plaintiff is an
"insufficient reason to deny a mandatory injunction
requiring ... removal." 203
Courts must also consider the conduct of plaintiff.204 Courts may
decline to issue a mandatory injunction if the plaintiffs conduct or
behavior was inequitable in some way.205 Examples of factors considered
by the court are misleading conduct by plaintiff,206 prejudicial delay in
asserting his rights, 20 7 and coming to the court with unclean hands. 2 08 "In
some situations, however, the plaintiff may be partly responsible for the
hardship the defendant would suffer from an injunction," and courts will
consider this in balancing the equities of the parties.20 9
At the heart of all encroachment cases are property rights. The
amount of property actually affected is generally small in terms of the land
involved. 21 0 Representative of the amount and type of property interests
201. Id. at 595.
202. Adjoining Landowners, supra note 26, § 124.
203. Id.
204. Dobbs, Remedies for Trespass, supra note 7, at 358.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Bunn Lake Prop. Owner's Ass'n v. Setzer, 560 S.E.2d 576, 581-82 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2002) (holding that "defendant's letters and other documents ... [that]
establish[ed] his intention to proceed with building, with or without the plaintiffs
permission" proved that defendant did not detrimentally rely on plaintiff's representations).
207. See, e.g., Rudisail v. Allison, 424 S.E.2d 696, 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he
equitable defense of laches may not be raised as a defense in an action at law of ejectment."
(quoting Phipps v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 965, 970 (4th Cir. 1988))).
208. See, e.g., Allen v. Wilmington & W.R. Co., 11 S.E. 826, 828 (N.C. 1800) (Avery,
J., concurring) ("[H]e who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into a court of
equity must come with clean hands." (quoting 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 816 (1881))).
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
210. See, e.g., Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Bowman, 51 S.E.2d 191 (N.C. 1949)
(building encroached fifty feet onto plaintiff's right of way); O'Neal v. Rollinson, 192 S.E.
688 (N.C. 1937) (wharf extended 3.8 feet onto riparian rights of plaintiffs); Leaksville
Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 112 S.E. 24 (N.C. 1922) (embankment
constructed twenty feet in length upon plaintiffs driveway); Williams v. S. & S. Rentals,
346 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (two-story building encroached one square foot);
Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (house encroached fifty feet onto
plaintiffs' lot).
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involved are fence posts that encroached approximately two inches onto
plaintiff s property,2 1' foundations that crossed the property line a fraction
of a foot,2 12 and a structure with eaves overhanging several inches on the
adjoining landowner's property.2 13 In each of these examples, plaintiffs
property is only slightly less valuable if the court denies injunctive relief,
but granting an injunction to compel removal would substantially affect the
defendant.214 An injunction would deprive defendant of using his property,
the building, "for its only valuable purpose." 215  However, plaintiffs
interest must not be overshadowed by the hardship defendant would suffer
if an injunction was granted.2 16 The court should base its decision not on
what plaintiff will gain if equitable relief is granted but on the hardship
denial will force him to endure.217
Therefore, before an injunction will issue, the court will consider the
relative property interests that will be lost by the granting or denial of an
injunction.2 18 One of the underlying policies in encroachment cases is the
unique quality of land.2 19 This quality becomes particularly relevant when
a court seeks to determine whether there is an adequate legal remedy. 2 20 If
the court denies an injunction, the ruling forces plaintiff to accept monetary
damages as just compensation for the land taken by the encroachment. 2 2 1 If
the court grants an injunction, the ruling compels defendant to remove the
structure.22 2 This places the defendant at a great disadvantage, although
one of his own making, to plaintiff's superior bargaining power. For this
reason, most injunctions under these circumstances are "for sale." 2 23 The
plaintiff will enforce the mandatory injunction only if the defendant does
not agree to exchange the right price for dissolution of the injunction.224
"In civilized society punishment is seldom put in the hands of those
211. Zhuang Li Cai v. Uddin, 871 N.Y.S.2d 675, 676 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
212. Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 593 (Colo. 1951).
213. Beaty v. Gordon, 364 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Ark. 1963).
214. McCLINTOCK, supra note 139, § 140.
215. Id.
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 cmt. b (Am. LAW INST. 1979).
217. Id.
218. See MCCLNTOCK, supra note 139, § 140.
219. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 119, § 10.5.
220. Spyke, supra note 118, at 392.
221. Dobbs, Remedies for Trespass, supra note 7, at 367.
222. See Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
223. Keeton & Morris, supra note 178, at 416; see, e.g., AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 985
P.2d 757, 764 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
224. Keeton & Morris, supra note 178, at 416.
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harmed, and no special justification exists for giving landowners the office
of punishing encroachers." 2 25
"Without implying that all men are mercenary, the conclusion is still
possible that a case can hardly occur in which land of more than monetary
value is seriously threatened by a substantial encroachment." 226  A
landowner who values his property and considers it priceless surely will not
sit by and fail to object while his neighbor builds a structure partially on his
land. Every landowner has a reasonable obligation to police his own
land.227 A landowner is not entitled to sit idly by while his neighbor builds
on his land; the landowner has a moral responsibility to notify his neighbor
to prevent the harm from occurring.228 If the landowner observes and does
nothing, the court could interpret this to mean the landowner does not
consider the land priceless and thus deem monetary damages an adequate
remedy. 229 This theory, however, would not apply to a landowner who
lives out of state or is away from home for an extended period of time and
returns to find a completed structure encroaching on his property.230 In this
situation, it would seem unjust to make the landowner sell his land at a
price set by the court if he does not want to sell.
B. Encroachments Doctrine Distinguished from the Betterments Doctrine
Although North Carolina courts do not apply the relative hardship
doctrine under the encroachment doctrine,2 31 some sources indicate that the
relative hardship doctrine as it applies to encroachment cases has been
codified in the doctrine of betterments.23 2 The doctrine of betterments,
however, "is separate and distinct from the more familiar encroachments
doctrine" and by extension the equitable hardship doctrine as it applies to
permanent encroachments.2 33 The betterments doctrine is a defense to
225. Id.
226. Id. at 414.
227. Joseph William Singer, The Rule ofReason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
1369, 1396 (2013).
228. Id.
229. Keeton & Morris, supra note 178, at 414-15.
230. See Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 300. (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding
plaintiffs' injunction requiring removal after returning from overseas military orders and
finding defendants' new home encroaching fifty feet onto plaintiffs' property).
231. The encroachment doctrine as applied here refers to the permanent encroachment of
a structure onto an adjoining landowner's property.
232. Singer, supra note 227, at 1396 n.77 ("Some states have adopted laws called
'betterment statutes' that effectively codify the relative hardship doctrine").
233. 1 PATRICK K. HETRICK & JAMES B. McLAUGHLIN, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE
LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 14.26 (6th ed. 2016).
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prevent unjust enrichment by a plaintiff landowner, and the equitable
hardship doctrine is a principle used by the courts to determine if injunctive
relief will issue against an encroaching defendant. 234 The encroacher may
attempt to seek compensation for a court-ordered injunction by asserting a
claim under the betterments doctrine; however, it will be an exercise in
futility.235
An interesting North Carolina case clearly illustrates this point. The
plaintiffs garage and driveway encroached twenty-five feet onto the
defendant landowner's adjoining property because of improvements
plaintiff made on her land in 1973.236 In 1977, plaintiff filed an action
asking the court to require defendant "to sell and convey plaintiff a strip of
,1237land on which [the] improvements are located at a reasonable price.
Naturally, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and plaintiff filed a motion
for leave to amend the complaint. The amended complaint alleged that if
defendant elected to require plaintiff to remove the encroachments from
defendant's land, defendant should be required to pay "the cost of removal
and the cost of rebuilding plaintiff s house." 2 38 The district court dismissed
the action and plaintiff appealed.2 39 On appeal, plaintiff argued that her
claim fell under the doctrine of betterments. 2 4 0 The plaintiff alleged she
acted in good faith; the defendant was aware of and did not object to the
encroachments; defendant should not be unjustly enriched by the
improvements on her land; plaintiff was willing to pay for the strip of land
involved; and the harm to defendant would be minimal.2 4 1 The appellate
court stated that "plaintiffs action [was] not based on . .. [the] statutory
provision for betterments or under the common law right to claim for
betterments"; thus, "plaintiff [was] not entitled to such an action." 24 2 The
court went on to state that "[i]t is not necessary for us to determine whether
defendant might prevail in a subsequent action seeking a mandatory
injunction for removal of the encroachment. However, such an action
might present a more appropriate forum for . .. resolving the conflict
between the parties to this action." 24 3
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. McCoy v. Peach, 251 S.E.2d 881, 882 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 883.
243. Id. at 884 (citing Warden, supra note 87, at 692-721.
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The claim for betterments only applies when a person possesses land
under color of title, constructs permanent improvements on the land, and is
later sued in ejectment by the true owner.24 4 The right is a "defensive
right" that accrues when the true owner asserts his rights to the land and
obtains a judgment giving him the right to eject the improver.2 45 At this
point, "[t]he improver must file his claim for betterments in the same action
he has been named a defendant but after judgment for possession has been
rendered against him." 246
"The purpose of the betterments doctrine is to prevent the successful
title claimant from being unjustly enriched by taking not only the title but
also the value of permanent improvements made to the land in good faith
by the one who loses title." 24 7 In encroachment cases, however, title to
land is rarely an issue. The encroacher inadvertently builds across his
property line because of a mistake in judgment, not because he, in good
faith, thinks he has title to the land.
In addition, the equitable hardship doctrine in encroachment cases is
not a defense. It is a standard applied by the court to protect a landowner
from the forced taking of his land by an encroaching structure. 248  The
betterments doctrine protects the defendant who loses title to land he
thought he owned; the equitable hardship doctrine protects the true
landowner from the taking of his land by one with no legal or enforceable
right or permission to encroach.
Oddly enough, before equity will apply in either the encroachments or
the betterments doctrines, one must, in good faith, believe he had the right
to build where he did.249 Under the betterments doctrine, "an honest belief
of the improver in his right or title satisfies the requirement of good faith";
however, the court must be satisfied with the improver's reason for his
244. Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 146 S.E.2d 434, 437 (N.C. 1966) (citing Pamlico Co.
v. Davis, 107 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. 1959); Harrison v. Darden, 26 S.E.2d 860 (N.C. 1943);
Rogers v. Timberlake, 25 S.E.2d 167 (N.C. 1943); Faison v. Kelly, 62 S.E. 1086 (N.C.
1908)).
245. HETRICK & MCLAUGHLIN, JR., supra note 233, § 14.30.
246. Id.
247. State v. Taylor, 368 S.E.2d 601, 604 (N.C. 1988) (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
248. See Singer, supra note 227, at 1395.
249. See Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo. 1951) ("[W]here the
encroachment was in good faith, we think the court should weigh the circumstances so that
it shall not act oppressively." (citing POMEROY, supra note 190, § 508)); Beacon Homes, 146
S.E.2d at 437 ("[The betterments doctrine] applies only where the improvement was
constructed by one who was in possession of the land under color of title and who, in good
faith and reasonably, believed he had good title to the land." (citing Pamlico Co., 107
S.E.2d 306; Harrison, 26 S.E.2d 860; Rogers, 25 S.E.2d 167; Faison, 62 S.E. 1086)).
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belief.25 0 In encroachment cases, the innocent encroacher must prove he
did not have notice that he was invading the land of another.251 In the
former, defendant's claim must be under color of title while in the latter the
defendant is not required to make this assertion.
A claim for betterments may allow the defendant "to recover the value
of the improvements" he has placed on the land of the true owner.2 52 This
is because the betterments doctrine is "rooted in the equitable notion that
one who successfully claims title to realty from another who held the land
in a good faith belief that he owned it ought to pay for the permanent
improvements which will be acquired with the title." 25 3  Under the
encroachments doctrine, plaintiff is not seeking to acquire title; he instead
seeks to have an encroaching structure removed from his property and any
damages that result therefrom to be paid by the defendant. The court
applies the relative hardship doctrine to determine the relative harm that
will result to each party if a court issues an injunction to compel
removal. 254
In sum, the relative hardship doctrine applied under the
encroachments doctrine is not codified under the betterments statutes. The
doctrines are separate and distinct and should not be confused with each
other. North Carolina courts have clearly stated this point.255
C. Application of the Relative Hardship Doctrine in Other States
When the court orders an encroacher to remove his structure, the
ruling ends the invasion of property rights, but the subsequent harm to the
encroacher may be great. A mandatory injunction can be harsh, and one
who builds an encroachment in good faith may not deserve such
punishment. Many courts view the traditional rule as unfair and inefficient
and have decided to subject "property rights to a reasonableness standard
that requires judgment about the excusability of the builder's conduct
rather than rigid application of formal boundary designations."256 In other
250. HETRICK & MCLAUGHLIN, JR., supra note 233, § 14.27.
251. Palkovitz, supra note 195, at 711 (discussing innocent mistakes made without
notice and innocent mistakes made with notice but in good faith error).
252. HETRICK & MCLAUGHLIN, JR., supra note 233, § 14.26.
253. State v. Taylor, 368 S.E.2d 601, 604 (N.C. 1988) (Exum, C.J., dissenting).
254. See Singer, supra note 227, at 1396.
255. See McCoy v. Peach, 251 S.E.2d 881, 884 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Beacon Homes,
Inc. v. Holt, 146 S.E.2d 434, 437 (N.C. 1966) (court defines the betterments statute which is
clearly distinguishable from the relative hardship doctrine); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-340
(West 2015) (Notes of Decision, In General).
256. Singer, supra note 227, at 1397.
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words, these courts, unlike the North Carolina courts, have abandoned the
traditional rule and adopted the relative hardship doctrine.257
Courts have refused to grant injunctions to compel removal where the
encroachments were unintentional, defendants made an innocent mistake,
and the encroachments involved less than four inches 258 or as much as
fifty-eight feet. 25 9 The focus of the courts in these cases was not only the
amount of land involved but also the greatly disproportionate damage the
encroacher would suffer if he had to remove the structure. For example,
plaintiff brought an action against defendant for a mandatory injunction to
compel removal of building footings that extended seven feet below the
ground and encroached two- to three-and-one-half inches onto plaintiffs
property.260  The trial court granted the mandatory injunction, and
defendant appealed. 26 ' The appellate court noted that the encroachment
was slight and did not interfere with plaintiffs use of his property.262 In
addition, defendant's expense and his resulting hardship "would be so great
in comparison with any advantage of plaintiffs" that to require removal
would be "unconscionable"; the trial court should have denied the
263mandatory injunction. Another example involved a warehouse that
encroached 2.3 feet on the adjoining landowner's property, and the
landowner brought an action seeking a mandatory injunction to compel
removal of the encroaching portion of the warehouse.264 The chancery
court denied the injunction, and the landowner appealed.265 On appeal, the
court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that "the right to an
injunction requiring the removal of encroaching buildings . .. is governed
257. Id. at 1396-97.
258. See Stuttgart Elec. Co. v. Riceland Seed Co., 802 S.W.2d 484, 484 (Ark. Ct. App.
1991) (warehouse encroached 2.3 feet onto adjoining landowner's property); Graven v.
Backus, 163 N.W.2d 320, 324 (N.D. 1968) (wall encroached 1.2 inches and window sills
and roof overhang in the wall encroached 3 inches); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d
592, 592 (Colo. 1951) (building footings 7 inches below ground encroached 2 to 3.5 inches
onto plaintiff s land).
259. Hunter v. Carroll, 15 A. 17, 17 (N.H. 1888) (two houses encroached onto plaintiff s
property, one 7.45 feet and another 4.95 feet); AMKCO Ltd. v. Welborn, 21 P.3d 24, 24
(N.M. 2001) (truck stop encroached 58 feet onto adjoining property).
260. Golden Press, 235 P.2d at 594.
261. Id. (encroachment was a one-story brick-and-cinder-block business building).
262. Id. at 596.
263. Id.
264. Stuttgart Elec. Co. v. Riceland Seed Co., 802 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Ark. Ct. App.
1991).
265. Id. at 484.
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by equitable principles."266 In this case, it would cost defendant $10,000 to
remove the building, the harm to plaintiff was slight, and forcing "the
removal of the building would be harsh, drastic, and totally inequitable." 2 6 7
An interesting resolution in a North Dakota case was where the trial
court gave defendant the option of removing the encroachment or paying
plaintiff for the invaded portion of the land, and in turn plaintiff would
convey that portion of the land to defendant. 268 The price of the land was
set by the court based on the total value of the plaintiff's land, the amount
of land encroached upon by defendant, and defendant's cost to remove the
encroachment. 2 69  The court, by setting the price itself, avoided the
extortion problem. In this case, one wall of defendant's building
encroached onto plaintiffs land 1.2 inches, and "two windowsills located
in the wall and the roof overhang encroached 3 inches." 2 70  Plaintiff
brought an action requesting a mandatory injunction to compel removal,
and defendant prayed for dismissal or a court-ordered sale of the portion of
land at issue. 2 7 1 The trial court found the encroachment resulted from an
innocent mistake, plaintiff did not establish present or future injury, and the
severe effect of a potential mandatory injunction was "plain." 2 7 2  The
plaintiff appealed and contended the trial court erred in not granting an
unconditional mandatory injunction. On appeal, the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment stating that a court of
equity has the option of awarding damages instead of an injunction and
gave defendant sixty days from entry of judgment on remittitur to make his
choice.2 73
One of the most interesting encroachment cases arose in New Mexico
and is unique because of the amount of land involved and the option of
remedies given the encroacher. AMKCO, one of the plaintiffs, purchased
266. Id. at 488 (reversing the chancery court's grant of an easement to each party over
the property of the other).
267. Id. (taking the same approach as the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS to balance
the equities).
268. Graven v. Backus, 163 N.W.2d 320, 324 (N.D. 1968). The trial court applied the
balancing of the equities doctrine before granting a conditional mandatory injunction. Id.
The court also set the amount of damages. Id. See also Morgan v. Veach, 139 P.2d 976,
983 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943) (finding plaintiff was entitled to a mandatory injunction but
rendering an alternative judgment which ordered the defendant to remove the encroachment
or pay the plaintiff a specific amount in damages).
269. See Graven, 163 N.W.2d at 326-28.
270. Id. at 324. The encroachment ran a length of 49.35 feet for a total encroachment of
approximately 12 square feet or an area equaling 0.17 percent of the lot. Id. at 326.
271. Id. at 320.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 329 (citing 28 AM. JUR. Injunctions § 292, at 805 (1965)).
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land on which to build a $1,250,000 truck stop/convenience center. Prior
to construction, plaintiffs sold the land it did not need to defendant
Welborn.27 5  After completing the truck stop, plaintiffs discovered the
building encroached fifty-eight feet on defendant's land.276 Plaintiffs
notified defendant, offered to purchase the land affected by the
encroachment, and, of course, defendant declined to sell.2 77 Plaintiffs went
a step further and "purchased a fifty-eight foot strip of property" that
adjoined defendant's property on the south side and offered to exchange the
parcels of land; again, defendant refused.278 Plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment to determine the rights of the parties and an order compelling
defendant to convey the property at issue for a fair market price.2 79 The
trial court found plaintiffs relied in good faith on a survey and unknowingly
constructed the encroachment on defendant's property; the defendant was
unaware of the encroachment until plaintiffs notified him; and the cost for
plaintiffs to remove the encroachment and resulting damages would be
disproportionate to any damage to defendant's property.28 0 The court
entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to
convey the fifty-eight foot strip of land to plaintiffs "in exchange for its fair
market value or for the replacement lot." 281
Defendant appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded
for entry of an order requiring removal of the encroachment. 28 2 Of course,
plaintiffs raised the issue of economic waste on appeal, and the court's
response was most interesting.2 83 The court stated that if plaintiffs did not
274. AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 985 P.2d 757, 758 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 21 P.3d
24 (N.M. 2001).
275. AMKCO, 985 P.2d at 759.
276. Md at 758.
277. Id Plaintiffs did not know the site plan and the survey "placed a portion of the
construction site fifty-eight feet south of the project's north boundary line." Id. After the
building was completed, plaintiffs sought permanent financing from Conoco Oil Company.
Id AMKCO requested a new survey which revealed the building encroached on
approximately nine percent of defendant's land. Id
278. Id
279. Id. Alternatively, plaintiffs sought reformation of the deed to defendant alleging the
deed was a result of a surveyor's error. Id. Plaintiffs abandoned this claim; however,
defendant counterclaimed for ejectment. Id.
280. Id. at 760. Plaintiffs would lose $188,837 in improvements made on the land as
well as $107,687 in an annual loss of revenue, and "the $1,250,000 project would be
rendered unviable." Id. Defendant offered no evidence he suffered any hardship other than
the taking of approximately nine percent of his vacant land. AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 21
P.3d 24, 29 (N.M. 2001).
281. Id. at 26.
282. AMKCO, 985 P.2d at 764.
283. Id. at 763-64.
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want to waste their investment, "then as this Court has said in the past
under somewhat analogous circumstances, 'nothing forbids [plaintiffs]
from negotiating with [defendant] to waive its right to compel removal of
the building."' 284 The court went on to state that the fact that a "'court
[ordered] injunction provides [defendant] with a very strong bargaining
position,' is no grounds for denying [defendant] the sole use and possession
of his own private property, particularly when that bargaining position is
simply a natural consequence of [plaintiffs'] own mistake." 285  The
defendant appealed the court's decision to the New Mexico Supreme
Court.286
The New Mexico Supreme Court applied a two-part test combining
the irreparable harm rule and the relative hardship doctrine.287 According
to the court, the first part of the test establishes a threshold; "[t]he party
seeking the injunction must show that it will suffer irreparable harm if the
court denies injunctive relief." 288  However, even if the party shows
irreparable harm, the court must then balance the equities to determine if it
should issue the injunction.28 9
Here, the court held the defendant proved irreparable harm because
the encroachment deprived defendant "of all use of a portion of his
property." 290 Then, the court applied the second part of the test and stated
that it had to consider factors other than the size of the encroachment. 2 91
The court looked at the innocence of plaintiffs, "the disparity in economic
consequences," and the lack of evidence defendant would suffer a hardship
if it denied injunctive relief.292 The court reversed the court of appeals and
affirmed the trial court's denial of an injunction to compel removal of the
improvements.29 3 The final issue before the court was the appropriate
remedy when no injunction would issue. The court ruled that the defendant
could elect a remedy from among three options: (1) an easement in which
284. Id. at 764 (quoting Cafeteria Operators, L.P. v. Coronado-Santa Fe Assocs., 952
P.2d 435, 443 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997)).
285. Id. at 764 (quoting Cafeteria Operators, 952 P.2d at 443). Although courts are not
supposed to sanction extortion in encroachment cases, the court's statements here certainly
suggest defendant can use his superior bargaining position to ask for and receive an amount
far in excess of the property's value.
286. AMKCO, 21 P.3d at 25.
287. Id. at 26-27.
288. Id. at 27.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 28-29.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 30.
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appropriate payment should not exceed a specified amount,
(2) "conveyance of title ... in exchange for its fair market value," or
(3) "conveyance of title in return for the replacement" lot.294 This was a
novel remedy that would result in a just outcome for both parties.
These cases are only a few of the many in which courts applied the
relative hardship doctrine and denied injunctive relief The amount of land
involved varied from mere inches to fifty-eight feet; the structures included
houses, office buildings, and service stations, but there were common
factors in each case. The encroacher made an innocent mistake; the
encroachment was not intentional and was unknown to the encroacher
when made. Also, the harm to the encroacher caused by granting
injunctive relief would be greatly disproportionate to the harm to the
adjoining landowner caused by denying injunctive relief. In each of these
cases, the courts denied injunctive relief based on the equities between the
parties. Not all jurisdictions follow this line of reasoning. North Carolina
is one of those jurisdictions, and the real issue is why.
IV. NORTH CAROLINA'S APPLICATION OF THE LAW IN ENCROACHMENT
CASES
The law in North Carolina is simple. If a landowner builds a structure
that encroaches on his neighbor's property, and the neighbor requests a
mandatory injunction to compel removal, a court will grant it.295 North
Carolina courts treat innocent, negligent, and willful defendants the
same. 2 96 Balancing the equities is a doctrine commonly invoked by other
jurisdictions in encroachment cases in which the court will deny injunctive
relief to the aggrieved party in favor of money damages if the encroaching
party created the encroachment innocently; it was a mistake, and the
encroachment is slight compared with the injury to defendant if he has to
remove it.2 97 North Carolina courts have discussed the relative hardship
doctrine but refuse to apply it in cases where a permanent structure
encroaches on an adjoining landowner's property.298  This Section
discusses North Carolina courts' rationale for refusing to apply the relative
hardship doctrine. It will then discuss how courts have applied this
294. Id. at 29. The appropriate remedy was an issue of first impression. The court stated
it had not "had the opportunity to address the proper remedy for an encroachment when the
relative hardship doctrine necessitates a remedy other than removal." Id.
295. See Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
296. See id. (holding that defendant must remove its building even though neither party
was aware of the encroachment onto plaintiff s property).
297. See, e.g., Keeton & Morris, supra note 178, at 412-17.
298. See infra Section IV.C.
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rationale in subsequent cases. But first, this Section will look at the rare
instance where both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North
Carolina Supreme Court advocated for the relative hardship doctrine.
A. Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co.: The Enigma2 99
Landowners brought a suit alleging their property damage was caused
by disposed land and rock, and their prayer for relief sought both a
mandatory injunction and pecuniary damages. 300 At trial, the court asked
plaintiffs which remedy they desired to pursue: the remedy for damages or
the equitable remedy.30 ' Plaintiffs elected to pursue the latter.302
The land and rock deposits at issue resulted from disposal of massive
amounts of rock by defendant as part of a highway project.3 03 There was
evidence defendant would have to remove about 2,400,000 cubic yards of
materials, which would take nine years at a cost of $13,500,000 if the court
granted the mandatory injunction to compel removal. 304 The trial court
found in favor of plaintiffs.305 It also found, however, that "plaintiffs
would suffer irreparable harm for which they had no adequate remedy at
law" and, accordingly, "ordered defendants to remove the waste" within a
reasonable time to be established by the court.3 06
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment against defendants and reversed and
remanded the case.307 However, in dicta, the court addressed the trial
court's issuance of the mandatory injunction compelling defendant to
299. See Weeks, supra note 2, at 88-90 (providing context for the application of the
equitable hardship doctrine in North Carolina).
300. Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., 323 S.E.2d 765, 767 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984),
modified and aff'd, 342 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. 1986). Multiple plaintiffs brought suit against
Asheville Contracting Co., which was under contract with the Department of Transportation
(DOT). The court dismissed the claims against DOT. Id.
301. Clark, 342 S.E.2d at 836.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 834.
304. Clark, 323 S.E.2d at 768. The facts indicate the harm to plaintiffs in this case was
the dumping of rocks near their property, which created a nuisance and violated a restrictive
covenant on two of the lots. Id. at 767. Plaintiffs also claimed water damages on their
property caused by the flow of water as a result of the rock piles. Id.
305. Id. at 768.
306. Id. There is no indication the trial court considered the hardship to defendant if the
rocks had to be removed in comparison to the hardship the plaintiffs would suffer if the
rocks remained. The court issued the injunction based on irreparable harm to the plaintiffs
without balancing the equities of the parties.
307. Id. at 769.
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remove the rocks.308 In its comments, the court reiterated the evidence
regarding the cost and amount of time it would take to remove the rocks,
the fact the trial court made no findings of fact on the evidence, and that
findings of fact should be made before ordering an injunction to compel
removal. 309 The court went on to state that "[i]n determining whether to
grant an injunction, the court must consider the relative
convenience-inconvenience and the comparative injuries to the parties."310
Defendant petitioned for discretionary review, which was granted.31 '
On grant of certiorari, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
"substantial issues of material fact" precluded summary judgment; the
court affirmed and modified the holding of the court of appeals.312 This
court, again in dicta, addressed the issue of the mandatory injunction.3 13
The court stated that because plaintiffs had only pursued injunctive relief, it
must remand the case for further findings of fact before ordering
defendants to remove the rocks. 3 14 "[W]e find it worthwhile to repeat the
cautionary statement of the Court of Appeals that on remand 'the court
must consider the relative convenience-inconvenience and the comparative
injuries to the parties. "'315
Of note, the court in this case did not address the nature of the
trespass. However, considering the massive amount of rock at issue, one
can conclude that, even though the trespass was not a permanent structure,
it was physically permanent in nature. In addition, the court did not
characterize the trespass as either continuing or permanent. Because the
trial court could and did abate the trespass at the plaintiffs' request, though,
characterization as a continuing trespass is proper. Another interesting fact
is the court of appeals stated that under the plaintiffs' claim, the plaintiffs
might prove defendants acted outside the contract or were negligent, yet the
court advocated consideration of the relative hardship doctrine.316 This is
interesting because the conduct of the defendant is a threshold
consideration in balancing the equities of the parties. Negligence on the
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. It is interesting that the North Carolina Court of Appeals appears to make the
application of the relative hardship doctrine mandatory by using the verb "must."
311. Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., 342 S.E.2d 833, 834 (N.C. 1986).
312. Id. at 839.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. (quoting Clark, 323 S.E.2d at 769).
316. Clark, 323 S.E.2d at 769.
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part of the defendant weighs against him in determining whether injunctive
relief is proper. Of course, this is only one of several factors considered. 3 17
Although the trial court found the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable
harm if it denied the injunction, it did not consider the disparity in
economic consequences if the defendants had to remove the rocks.318 Here,
there was evidence that an injunction would force defendants to remove
between 1,500,000 and 2,400,000 cubic yards of waste material that would
take nine years at a cost of $13,500,000.319 Obviously, the disparity in
economic consequences prompted the appellate courts to mandate that the
trial court consider the relative hardship doctrine on remand. The real
question is why the courts advocated consideration of the doctrine in this
case but have not considered it in cases dealing with permanent structures
where the disparity between the parties was equally significant.
B. The Current Standard: Bishop v. Reinhold
The North Carolina Court of Appeals set out the rationale for granting
a mandatory injunction in permanent encroachment cases in Bishop v.
Reinhold.3 2 0 When the court stated its reasons, it did so without
considering the relative hardship doctrine. Since 1984, North Carolina
courts have followed the precedent set by this case and its rationale even
though the facts in subsequent cases are clearly distinguishable from the
facts in Bishop.
The defendants in Bishop were the original owners of all the land
involved in the case. 3 2 1 They conveyed a portion of the land to plaintiffs
and retained a portion for themselves. 322 While the plaintiff was away
serving his country in the United States Air Force, defendants built a home
that encroached onto plaintiffs' property.32 3 Seven years later, when
plaintiff returned and learned of the encroachment, he and his wife sued for
removal of the house.324 A jury found that defendants had wrongfully
trespassed and awarded damages; defendants appealed.32 5 The court of
317. See supra Section III.A.2.
318. See Clark, 342 S.E.2d at 836.
319. The court of appeals indicated 2.4 million cubic yards of rock deposits. Clark, 323
S.E.2d at 768. The North Carolina Supreme Court indicated an amount between 1.3 and 1.5
million cubic yards. Clark, 342 S.E.2d at 835.
320. Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 300 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
321. Id. at 298.
322. Id. at 300.
323. Id. at 299.
324. Id. at 300.
325. Id. at 299.
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appeals remanded the case to the trial court and ordered the court to grant a
mandatory injunction for the removal of the portion of defendants' house
that encroached upon plaintiffs' property.32 6
The court of appeals based its rationale on its characterization of the
encroachment as a continuing trespass, which it described as "a peculiar
animal in the law." 32 7  This is because "a separate and independent
trespass" occurs each day the structure remains on plaintiffs' property, and
each day the three-year statute of limitations begins to run. As a result,
there is not a statute of limitations bar to an action to remove the
encroachment until defendants had been in continuous use of the property
for a period of twenty years.328
Characterizing the encroachment as a continuing trespass also gives
rise to the possibility that a plaintiff could bring successive actions at law
for damages. 329 North Carolina is in accord with the majority view on this
issue. 33 0 To avoid multiple actions for damages, courts limit the plaintiff to
a single recovery of all damages. 33' Therefore, it lies within the authority
of the court to "grant 'equitable relief in the form of a permanent
injunction' as a proper remedy." 332
Courts deem a permanent injunction to be a proper remedy, and in
North Carolina the only remedy, because to deny a right of action for
injunctive relief would allow a defendant a right of eminent domain as a
private person.333 In the alternative, defendant would acquire a permanent
prescriptive easement to use plaintiffs land. "This the law will not do, as
the defendants have not been in possession 20 years[.]" 334 This is based on
326. Id. at 305.
327. Id. at 300.
328. Id. at 301 ("Any action to remove the encroachment, as in an action for
compensation for the easement, or for the fee by adverse possession would not be barred
until defendants had been in continuous use thereof for a period of twenty years so as to
acquire the right by prescription." (citing Love v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 20 S.E.2d 337, 338
(N.C. 1942))).
329. Id. at 300 ("Ordinarily, each day the trespass continues a new wrong is committed,
which in turn bears a new statute of limitations.").
330. Id. (citing PROSSER, supra note 46, § 13).
331. Id. at 300.
332. Id. (quoting Conrad v. Jones, 228 S.E.2d 618, 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976)). In
Conrad, plaintiffs brought an action to have a sewer line removed. Conrad, 228 S.E.2d at
618. The trial court denied injunctive relief because plaintiffs did not offer evidence of
irreparable harm. Id. at 619. However, the court of appeals stated that plaintiffs' claim was
based upon a continuing trespass and the proper remedy in such cases was equitable relief in
the form of a permanent injunction. Id.
333. Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 668-69 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
334. Bishop, 311 S.E.2d at 302.
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the theory that an award of money damages for a permanent encroachment
is tantamount to condemnation by a private citizen. North Carolina courts
"have allowed permanent damages only in situations involving
quasi-public entities."335
The principal policy underlying the court's rationale is the protection
of plaintiff's property rights. Put briefly, if a court finds an encroachment,
it is characterized as a continuing trespass, and defendant is not a
quasi-public entity, a mandatory injunction will issue as a matter of law. In
a later case, the court reaffirmed its position when it stated that "without
the threat of a mandatory injunction, builders may view the legal remedy as
a license to engage in private eminent domain." 3 36 The court will not force
a plaintiff to sell his land, nor will it allow the defendant to acquire the land
by means of "private eminent domain." 337
The Bishop court did not consider or even mention the relative
hardship doctrine, and it did not require the trial court to consider the
doctrine on remand. This is inconsistent with the general rule that, where
equity has jurisdiction, courts should consider the relative hardships of the
parties and the equities between them before granting or denying injunctive
relief.338 However, jurisdictions that take the position that a legal remedy is
inadequate to protect plaintiffs property interest grant injunctive relief
without great reluctance and without consideration of the doctrine. 3 39
Here, defendants' conduct, the plaintiffs' explained absence, and the
amount of land at issue were significant factors in determining the
appropriate remedy. 340 The facts indicate the defendants' conduct was
either negligent or intentional. After all, they were the original owner of
the land that was conveyed to plaintiffs.34 ' In addition, plaintiffs were
absent from the area for an extended period of time and returned to find a
completed structure encroaching onto their property. 34 2 The plaintiffs did
not know of the encroachment until they had the property surveyed so that
they could sell it.34 3 The amount of land at issue was not a few inches;
defendants' house encroached fifty feet onto plaintiffs' land.344 The
plaintiffs met their burden of proving irreparable harm if the house
335. See Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See Dobbs, Remedies for Trespass, supra note 7, at 358.
339. See id. at 352.
340. Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 300-01 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
341. Id. at 299.
342. Id. at 300.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 303.
2017] 327
41
Weeks: The Law Is What It Is, But Is It Equitable: The Law of Encroachme
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
remained on their property, but if the court had considered the relative
hardship doctrine, would the court have reached a more equitable
determination?
Ten months after the Bishop decision, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals handed down its decision in Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co. 3 45
There, the court of appeals required the trial court to consider the relative
hardship doctrine before granting a mandatory injunction to compel
removal. 346  This raises the issue of why the appellate court required
consideration of the doctrine in Clark but not in Bishop. In subsequent
cases, courts have discussed the relative hardship doctrine but never
applied it to the facts in the case.
C. Bishop Rationale Applied in North Carolina Encroachment Cases
This Section demonstrates how North Carolina courts treat all
encroaching defendants equally with respect to their mental states. It does
not matter whether the defendant was innocent, negligent, or willful; the
court will compel him to remove the encroaching structure. Since 1986,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals has recognized the relative hardship
doctrine in encroachment cases but has based its decisions on its holding in
Bishop. "[W]e are compelled by this Court's prior holding ... that since
the encroachment and continuing trespass have been established, and since
defendant is not a quasi-public entity, plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law
to . . .removal of the encroachment." 34 7 The court's position is very clear,
but should it have reconsidered its position in subsequent cases based on
the facts and equities of each case?
1. Williams v. South & South Rentals, Inc.: Innocent Encroachment
of One Square Foot3 48
Two years after its decision in Bishop, another permanent
encroachment case presented the court of appeals with facts distinguishable
from the prior case, yet the holding in both cases was the same. Did the
court take the course of least resistance by following the precedent it set in
Bishop? At least one judge was of the opinion it did.349
345. Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., 323 S.E.2d 765 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), modified
and aff'd, 342 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. 1986).
346. Id. at 769; see supra Section IV.A.
347. Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
348. Id. It is interesting to note that the court of appeals decided Williams three months
after the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co.
349. Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 669 (Webb, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Williams,
see supra Section III.A. 1.
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The facts in the case are interesting and show the plaintiffs superior
bargaining position. One corner of defendant's two-story brick apartment
building encroached approximately one foot onto plaintiffs property. 3 50
Neither party was aware of the encroachment until nine years after
construction of the building.351 Defendant decided to sell his property and
learned of the encroachment when he had the land surveyed. 3 52 He went to
plaintiff, advised him of the encroachment, and offered to purchase the land
in question for a fair price.353 The plaintiffs property was an "oddly
shaped" tract of land located largely in a creek bed and "consist[ed] of
one-fourth to one-third acre"; plaintiffs asking price for the land was
$45,000.354 Defendant refused to pay that price for an unusable tract of
land.355 Plaintiff brought an action in trespass and requested a mandatory
injunction to compel removal.356
The lower court barred the action after it found the encroachment to
be a continuing trespass and applied the three-year statute of limitations.35 7
The court dismissed plaintiffs claim, and plaintiff appealed from the entry
of the judgment.3 58 The court of appeals reversed and remanded the lower
court's judgment, stating that the action was not barred by the statute of
limitations because plaintiff requested a permanent remedy, which was
"subject to the twenty-year statute of limitations for adverse possession." 35 9
In its opinion, the court of appeals discussed the relative hardship
doctrine and the underlying policy considerations that the doctrine is
designed to eliminate. The court went so far as to state, "there may be
situations, other than ... quasi-public franchise[s], where sufficient public
interest exists to make the right of abatement at the instance of an
individual improper, and defendant should be permitted to demand that
permanent damages be awarded." 3 6 0 Nevertheless, the court stated it was
compelled to follow its holding in Bishop and remanded the case to the
lower court for entry of a mandatory injunction.361 The court held that
since the plaintiff established the encroachment and continuing trespass,
350. Id. at 667.
351. Id. at 666.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 667.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 668.
360. Id. at 669 (citing Rhodes v. City of Durham, 81 S.E. 938 (N.C. 1914)).
361. Id.
2017] 329
43
Weeks: The Law Is What It Is, But Is It Equitable: The Law of Encroachme
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
and defendant was not a quasi-public entity, plaintiff, as a matter of law,
was entitled to have the encroachment removed.362
Judge Webb in his dissent did not agree with the majority's rationale
and stated that the rule in Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co. governed in
this case.363 He disagreed with the majority's reasoning that plaintiff was
entitled to removal of the encroachment as a matter of law since the
defendant was not a quasi-public entity. "In determining whether to grant
an injunction, the court must consider the relative
convenience-inconvenience and the comparative injuries to the parties."364
The dissenting opinion echoed the principle that before a mandatory
injunction will issue courts should consider the relative hardships to the
parties and the equities between them.
The majority did not consider this principle but instead followed the
precedent set forth in Bishop.365 The only fact common to Bishop and
Williams was that, in both cases, the defendant encroached on the
plaintiffs property. The encroachment in the former case was at best
negligent, while the encroachment in the latter was completely innocent.
The extent of the encroachment was significantly different in the two cases:
One structure encroached fifty feet, while the other encroached a mere
square foot. The defendant in Williams notified the plaintiff as soon as he
learned of the encroachment and made an offer to purchase the land at fair
market value, and the plaintiff only agreed to sell at an unreasonable
price.36 6 In addition, plaintiff did not provide any evidence he would suffer
a hardship if the court denied injunctive relief. Despite the fact that these
cases are easily distinguishable, the court of appeals based its holding on
the one fact that the two cases had in common: the encroachment. It did
not consider the conduct of the parties, the amount of property involved, or
the potential loss of relative property interests.
At the end of the day, the defendant in Williams was in an untenable
position. He either had to remove a portion of his building, which would
result in economic waste at considerable expense, or negotiate with
plaintiff to waive his right to compel removal of the building.36 7 If the
court had considered the relative hardship doctrine, it may have reached a
more equitable result.
362. Id.
363. Id. (Webb, J., dissenting).
364. Id.
365. See supra notes 291-310 and accompanying text.
366. Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 665.
367. Id.
330 [Vol. 39:2
44
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss2/4
THE LAW IS WHAT IT IS, BUT IS IT EQUITABLE?
2. Young v. Lica: A Bridge, an Easement, and a Continuing
Trespass 368
This case involved an easement granted to defendants by out-of-state
plaintiffs. 36 9 The easement allowed defendants to cross plaintiffs' land to
access the highway over a single-lane bridge located between the parties'
properties. 3 70 Defendants decided to make improvements to the bridge and
contacted plaintiffs once before beginning construction. 3 7 1 Defendants
constructed a new bridge that was eight feet higher and four times wider
than the old bridge, which affected plaintiffs' access to their property. 3 72
As a result, plaintiffs sued defendants "seeking a permanent injunction and
damages for trespass to [their] property and nuisance."3 73
The trial court concluded that plaintiffs had no valid claim for trespass
or nuisance because defendants only improved the easement of which they
were always entitled to use; the court denied plaintiffs' injunction and
ordered a trial on the issue of damages for the additional burden imposed
on plaintiffs' land by the new bridge.374 Plaintiffs decided to abandon their
claim for damages and moved for a new trial to pursue their claim for
injunctive relief. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion, and they
appealed.375
On appeal, plaintiffs contended defendants trespassed on their land
and sought a mandatory injunction to compel removal of the new bridge
and replacement of it with a bridge similar to the original.37 6 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals first addressed the trial court's failure "to
determine the location and boundary of the easement and whether
defendants made an unauthorized entry on plaintiffs' property. 377 Until
the property interests of the parties were determined, the court could not
render a proper judgment.
Next, the court addressed the issue of the trespass. The court stated
that when one builds on another's land without permission, he commits a
continuing trespass and the usual remedy is a permanent injunction.378 The
368. Young v. Lica, 576 S.E.2d 421 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
369. Id. at 425.
370. Id. at 422.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 423.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 423-24.
377. Id. at 424.
378. Id. (citing Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, 346 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1986)).
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court then discussed the balancing test recognized in Clark and Williams.3 79
However, despite this discussion, the court recounted that in Williams it
was compelled to follow its holding in Bishop.380 In effect, the court was
telling defendant it would continue to follow this precedent.
The court reversed and remanded the case "for findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding the location and width of the easement." 381
The court also ordered the trial court to determine if defendants' new
construction trespassed on plaintiffs' land.382 The court of appeals held
that, after the trial court made a determination of whether defendants'
construction was physically located within the boundaries of the easement,
it must "render a judgment based upon law and precedents discussed
herein." 38 3 If the facts establish an encroachment and continuing trespass,
and defendant is not a quasi-public entity, plaintiffs will likely be entitled
as a matter of law to removal of the bridge.384
The facts here are somewhat analogous to the facts in Bishop. The
defendants here, like the defendant in Bishop, were negligent in
determining their property interest. In both cases, defendants dealt with an
absent plaintiff who learned of the encroachment after an extended absence
from his property. Therefore, it is interesting that the court discussed the
relative hardship doctrine in this case and not in Bishop. Of course, the
court promptly dismissed the doctrine as it did in Williams. This raises the
question of why the court continues to pay lip service to a doctrine that it is
not going to consider before granting or denying injunctive relief.
3. Cornelius v. Corry: Innocent Encroachment of Twenty-Two
Feet8 5
In an unpublished opinion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
reiterated the Bishop rule. The plaintiff and defendants in this case were
adjoining landowners.386 In 1985, defendants moved a house onto their
property, which crossed onto land owned by plaintiffs predecessor in title
by twenty-two feet. 38 7 At that time, both parties believed the house was
379. Id. at 424-25.
380. Id. at 425.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Cornelius v. Corry, No. COAO6-107, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2135 (N.C. Ct. App.
Oct. 17, 2006) (unpublished disposition).
386. Id. at *1.
387. Id. at *1-2.
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located entirely on defendants' property.388 Plaintiff acquired the land in
2001 and approximately three years later had her land surveyed.389  The
survey revealed the encroachment, and in 2005, plaintiff filed an action
seeking a mandatory injunction to compel removal of the house from her
property.390
Plaintiff obtained a mandatory permanent injunction, which required
that defendants remove the encroaching structure-the house-within 180
days.39 ' On appeal, defendants argued that the trial court erred because it
failed to "make findings of fact regarding the relative convenience and
inconvenience, and the comparative injuries to the parties" before granting
permanent injunctive relief.39 2 Defendants maintained the relative hardship
doctrine was required by the court's holding in Clark v. Asheville
Contracting Co. 393  The court, however, disagreed and stated that the
holding in Clark was "not the most compelling precedent" in determining
whether to grant or deny a mandatory injunction.394 The court reasoned
that "[w]hen one builds upon another's land without permission or right, a
continuing trespass is committed. '[T]he usual remedy for a continuing
trespass is a permanent injunction which in this case would be a mandatory
injunction for removal of the encroachment."' 395 The court went on to state
that, in addition to considering Clark's explanation of the relative hardship
doctrine, a trial court should also consider the conduct of the defendant and
whether the harm to defendant if the injunction issues is disproportionate to
the harm plaintiff will suffer if the injunction is denied. 3 96  "Mere
inconvenience and expense are not sufficient to withhold injunctive relief.
The relative hardship must be disproportionate." 39 7
Defendants also contended that "the trial court failed to make any
findings regarding the injury plaintiff would suffer" if the injunction was
issued or denied.398 In this case, the trial court found it would cost
defendants $10,000 to $15,000 to move the house, the original cost of
moving the house to the property was $12,800, and the current tax value
388. Id. at *2.
389. Id.
390. Id. at *1-2.
391. Id. at *2.
392. Id. at *5.
393. Id. (citing Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., 323 S.E.2d 765 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984), modified and aff'd, 342 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. 1986)).
394. Id. at *6.
395. Id. (quoting Young v. Lica, 576 S.E.2d 421, 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)).
396. Id. at *6-7.
397. Id. at *7 (quoting Young, 576 S.E.2d at 425).
398. Id. at *7.
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was $78,000.399 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
findings of the trial court satisfied both Clark and Young. 4 00 This addressed
defendants' injury if the injunction was granted, but did it really address the
injury plaintiff would suffer if the injunction was denied?
The court of appeals then reiterated the rule that when a building
encroaches upon an adjoining landowner's property, the proper remedy is
removal.40' The court stated that based on the "prior holdings in Young,
Williams, and Bishop, and as the trial court properly found that defendants'
house encroached onto plaintiffs property . .. and as defendants are not a
quasi-public entity, plaintiff therefore is entitled to a mandatory injunction
ordering the removal of the encroaching structure."402
The facts in this case are analogous to the facts in Williams.
Defendants in both cases innocently encroached onto the plaintiffs
property and remained unaware of the encroachment for several years. The
encroachment was neither willful nor intentional in either case. The cost
for defendants to remove the structures was substantial. And, in each case,
the plaintiff was unaware of the encroachment for several years. In both
cases, the injury to the defendants was more than a mere inconvenience; the
hardship defendants suffered was greatly disproportionate to the injury
plaintiffs would have suffered from denial of the injunction. The facts in
both cases are distinguishable from the facts in Bishop; yet, the court of
appeals upheld the granting of a mandatory injunction compelling removal.
Considering the facts, was this an equitable outcome in either case?
Although the court discussed the relative hardship doctrine, it
promptly dismissed it as it had in previous cases.
4. Mathis v. Hoffman 403 A Fence, an Encroachment, and an
Unreasonable Landowner
This is a case where the parties could easily have resolved their issues
outside of court. But, when an encroachment is involved, it appears
common sense takes a back seat.
Plaintiffs built a fence between their and defendant's property. 4 04
Four years later, plaintiffs learned that defendant believed the fence
encroached onto her property.405 Defendant then had her property surveyed
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at *8.
402. Id. at *8-9.
403. Mathis v. Hoffman, 711 S.E.2d 825 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
404. Id. at 825.
405. Id.
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and notified the plaintiffs of the encroachment; however, she refused to
give plaintiffs a copy of the survey.40 6 Plaintiffs then initiated a special
proceeding to determine the actual property line.407 After the court
established the boundary line between the two parcels, it was clear that the
fence was built on defendant's property.408
Plaintiffs offered to pay to move the fence, but defendant was not in a
neighborly mood and "refused to allow plaintiffs to remove the fence." 4 09
In fact, on more than one occasion, defendant actually contacted local law
enforcement to report plaintiffs for trespassing when plaintiffs attempted to
relocate the fence.410 Plaintiffs then brought an action "seeking a
declaratory judgment of the parties' rights [and] an injunction granting
plaintiffs the right to remove the fence." 4 11 Plaintiffs prevailed at summary
judgment and gained the court's permission to enter "defendant's property
to remove and relocate the fence."4 12 To make a bad situation worse,
defendant appealed.413
On appeal, defendant contended "the trial court exceeded its authority
in granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment." 4 14  The North
Carolina Court of Appeals stated that an "injunction is a matter of
discretion which the trial court exercises after weighing the equities and the
advantages and disadvantages to the parties." 4 15 Here, the injunction issued
by the trial court was equitable. "[T]he injunction is a potential remedy in
any case in which it may provide significant benefits that are greater than
its costs or disadvantages."416 The record indicates the cost of constructing
the fence was $15,000, and the cost to remove it was $2,000.417 The trial
court found that, given the disparity between the amounts, it was "equitable
to allow plaintiffs to remove and relocate the fence." 4 18
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 826.
415. Id. (quoting Adams v. Beard Dev. Corp., 446 S.E.2d 862, 865 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994)).
416. Id. at 826 (quoting Roberts v. Madison Cty. Realtors Ass'n, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787
(N.C. 1996)).
417. Id.
418. Id.
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Defendant also contended she was entitled to a choice of remedies:
require that plaintiffs remove the fence or allow the fence to remain and be
subject to a claim for unjust enrichment. 419 Defendant relied on Beacon
Homes, Inc. v. Holt420 to support her contention, but the court of appeals
stated that defendant's reliance was misplaced.42 ' In Beacon Homes, the
North Carolina Supreme Court did not hold that a property owner has a
choice of remedies where a party mistakenly builds on the owner's
property.42 2 The court of appeals explained that the issue in Beacon Homes
was not the choice of remedies allowed to defendant, but whether the
plaintiffs alleged facts sufficient to find "defendant property owner had
been unjustly enriched." 4 23
The result in this case was equitable, but at what cost to the plaintiffs?
While plaintiffs were allowed to do what they had tried to do all along by
being a good neighbor, they were allowed to only after incurring the costs
of litigation. The parties in this case should have resolved the dispute
without resorting to a lawsuit.
Of note, the court of appeals stated that the trial court exercises its
discretion in granting injunctive relief after it balances the equities and
advantages and disadvantages between the parties.424 Yet, this same court
has dismissed the relative hardship doctrine repeatedly in encroachment
cases. 4 25 This inconsistency presents a paradox.
5. Graham v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.426: Predecessors in
Title, No Surveys, and an Encroachment
The parties owned adjoining lots in a subdivision, and neither party
had their lots surveyed at the time of acquisition.4 27 Plaintiff acquired her
lot by general warranty deed, and defendant acquired its lot pursuant to a
trustee's deed.42 8 Plaintiff did not discover the existence of an
419. Id.
420. Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 146 S.E.2d 434 (N.C. 1966).
421. Mathis, 711 S.E.2d at 826 (citing Beacon Homes, 146 S.E.2d 434). For the
background of Beacon Homes, see supra note 8.
422. Id.
423. Id. (citing Beacon Homes, 146 S.E.2d at 437).
424. Id.
425. See, e.g., Young v. Lica, 576 S.E.2d 421, 425 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Williams v. S.
& S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Bishop v. Reinhold, 311
S.E.2d 298, 304-05 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
426. Graham v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. (Graham 1D), 768 S.E.2d 614 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2015).
427. Id. at 615.
428. Id.
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encroachment on her property until a neighbor approached her about
purchasing the adjoining lot from defendant. 42 9  At the time of the
neighbor's inquiry, he asked the plaintiff if she was aware of the property
line dispute between the two parcels of land. 3 0 Since the plaintiff did not
have her property surveyed at the time she acquired it, she was unaware of
any dispute and did not look further into the matter.4 3 1 Later, the issue was
raised again when another individual approached the plaintiff about
purchasing the defendant's lot and asked about the property line dispute. 4 32
This individual had the defendant's lot surveyed, and the survey indicated
the house was on defendant's property and his septic tank system
encroached on plaintiff's lot.4 3 3
Plaintiffs title company then had the property surveyed, and the
second survey also showed the house and septic system partially
encroached on plaintiffs lot.4 34  Plaintiffs attorney contacted defendant
and demanded that defendant remove the encroaching structures from
plaintiff s property. 435 Defendant was given seven days to respond and was
told that if defendant did not respond within that time, "a civil action would
be filed." 43 6 Twelve days later, plaintiff sued defendant for an "ongoing
and continuing trespass." 4 3 7  Defendant answered, counterclaimed for
reformation of the deed and to quiet title, and filed a third-party complaint
against BB&T, the holder of the deed of trust to the encroaching
property.438  Defendant later amended its answer and counterclaimed for
adverse possession, which it later voluntarily dismissed.439 Plaintiff and
BB&T then filed a joint motion for summary judgment.4 40 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and BB&T and "ordered
defendant to remove the encroaching structures." 44 1 It is interesting to note
429. Id
430. Id
431. Id
432. Id
433. Id
434. Id
435. Id at 616.
436. Id
437. Id
438. Id
439. Id
440. Id
441. Id In a footnote, the trial court touched on the equitable hardship doctrine and
stated that since the parties were private parties, the balancing test was not required.
Graham v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., No. 12 CVS 4672, 2013 WL 9994490, at *3 n.4
(N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2013). An order requiring removal of the encroachment was the
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that the trial court, in its discretion, stayed the execution of the order for
sixty days "to permit the parties time to negotiate a mutually agreeable
settlement that [would] not require removal of the encroachment." 44 2 This
did not happen. The parties could not come to a mutually agreeable
solution, so the defendant opted to take its chances on appeal and filed a
motion with the trial court to stay and suspend the injunction pending
appeal.443
This case is interesting because it went before the court of appeals
twice with opposite outcomes.4 44 In the case's initial appearance before the
court, the court reversed summary judgment for plaintiff and BB&T and
remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant.4 45
Defendant contended that summary judgment in favor of plaintiff was
improper because plaintiff could not prove all of the essential elements of a
trespass. 4 4 6 "A claim of trespass requires possession of the property by
plaintiff when the alleged trespass was committed," 4 47 and here the plaintiff
was not in possession when the structures were built.448 The court agreed
with defendant and was guided by its decision in Woodring v. Swieter,4 4 9
where the court held that the plaintiff had no legally recognized interest in
the property in question until six years after the original trespass was
committed and could not satisfy the first element of a claim for trespass.450
Here, like the plaintiff in Woodring, plaintiff did not acquire the property in
question until "after the construction of the encroaching structures," and the
court stated it was compelled to follow the result in Woodring.45 1 Plaintiff
attempted to rely on the court's decision in Bishop v. Reinhold,452 but the
proper remedy. Id. at *3 (citing Young v. Lica, 576 S.E.2d 421, 424-25 (N.C. Ct. App.
2003)).
442. Graham, 2013 WL 9994490, at *4.
443. Graham v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., No. 12 CVS 4672, 2013 WL 9994491, at
*1 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 17, 2013).
444. Compare Graham v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. (Graham 1), No. COA13-881,
2014 WL 3510608, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. July 15, 2014) (unpublished disposition) (holding
that Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), did not apply because one of
the elements of the trespass claim was missing), with Graham II, 768 S.E.2d at 616 (holding
that all the elements of trespass were met, and the trespass was continuing under Bishop).
445. Graham 1, 2014 WL 3510608, at *4.
446. Id. at *2.
447. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Singleton v. Haywood Elec. Membership Corp.,
588 S.E.2d 871, 874 (N.C. 2003)).
448. Id.
449. Woodring v. Swieter, 637 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
450. Graham I, 2014 WL 3510608, at *3 (citing Woodring, 637 S.E.2d 269).
451. Id.
452. Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
338 [Vol. 39:2
52
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss2/4
THE LAW IS WHAT IT IS, BUT IS IT EQUITABLE?
court stated that plaintiff s reliance was misplaced because, unlike plaintiff,
the defendant in Bishop was in possession of the land when the
encroachment occurred.453
Plaintiff then petitioned for a rehearing.4 54 The second time this case
went before the court of appeals, the court reconsidered its previous
position and concluded that its reliance on Woodring was inconsistent with
prior decisions of the North Carolina courts regarding the law of continuing
trespasses to real property.455 In its second opinion, the court relied on
Bishop v. Reinhold as the controlling law on the issue of continuing
trespasses. 456 The court stated, "[i]mplicit in the holding of Bishop is the
principle that the first element of a trespass claim may be satisfied even
where ... the landowner asserting the claim did not own the property at the
time the original trespass was committed"457 as long as the landowner was
in possession while the trespass continued.4 58 Based on the forecast of the
evidence that the trespass elements were met, the court stated that the trial
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and BB&T
and properly issued a mandatory injunction to compel removal of the
encroachment. 4 59 The court quoted, "the usual remedy for a continuing
trespass is . . . a mandatory injunction for removal of the encroachment." 460
In this case, both parties contributed to the resulting property issues
even though predecessors in title constructed the encroachments before the
parties owned their respective lots. 4 6 1 The parties would have discovered
the encroachments at the time they acquired their property if either party
recognized the value of having their property surveyed.
When the trial court established that there was an encroachment, it
gave the parties an opportunity to reach a mutually agreeable solution.
Although the court issued a mandatory injunction for the removal of the
encroachment, it gave the parties time to negotiate and come to a resolution
453. Graham 1, 2014 WL 3510608, at *3 (citing Bishop, 311 S.E.2d at 298).
454. Graham v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. (Graham II), 768 S.E.2d 614, 615 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2015).
455. Id. at 616.
456. Id. (citing Bishop, 311 S.E.2d at 298) (holding that it did not apply because there,
the plaintiff was in possession of his property at the time the encroachment was first
committed, while plaintiff in the present case was not).
457. Graham II, 768 S.E.2d at 616.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 618 (citing Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986)).
460. Id. (quoting Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 669).
461. Id. at 615.
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that would not require the removal of the encroachment.46 2 It was as if the
court was giving the parties an opportunity to reach an equitable solution
that the court itself could not reach under the circumstances of the case.
The court stayed the execution of its order for sixty days; 4 6 3 however,
defendant filed a motion to stay and suspend the injunction pending appeal
just short of the end of the sixty-day period.464 This was because the parties
could not come to an equitable resolution.465
Even though the trial court gave the parties an opportunity to negotiate
a reasonable solution, the defendant remained in an inferior bargaining
position. If the parties could not agree otherwise, the defendant had to
remove the encroachment within ninety days of the expiration of the
sixty-day period.4 66 This situation was fraught with an opportunity for
extortion and economic waste. The parties did not resolve their dispute,
defendant appealed and, after the time and expense of two appeals, the
defendant ended up in the same position from which it began.
The foregoing cases involved very little in terms of land, but they
created complex problems for the landowners and the courts. In each case,
the landowner requested a mandatory injunction to compel removal, and
the courts relied on the precedent set in Bishop v. Reinhold to reach a
decision. In North Carolina, if an aggrieved landowner requests an
injunction to compel removal, it will likely be granted. It is apparent that
in North Carolina the only remedy for an encroachment is removal of the
structure, as shown in Williams, Young, Mathis, Cornelius, and Graham.467
V. NORTH CAROLINA SHOULD ADOPT AND APPLY THE RELATIVE
HARDSHIP DOCTRINE
Over the past thirty years, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has
refused to consider the relative hardship doctrine where permanent
encroachments were at issue, even while paying lip-service to it. In 1984,
the court held that if an encroachment and continuing trespass are
established and defendant is not a quasi-public entity, the law entitles
462. Graham v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., No. 12 CVS 4672, 2013 WL 9994490, at
*3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2013).
463. Id. at *1.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id. at *4.
467. See Mathis v. Hoffman, 711 S.E.2d 825, 825 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011); Cornelius v.
Corry, No. COAO6-107, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2135 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2006); Young
v. Lica, 576 S.E.2d 421 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d
665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
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plaintiff to have the encroachment removed.468 The court continues to
follow this precedent, even when the facts in subsequent cases are clearly
distinguishable. 46 9 But, is this what the law should be? Should the courts
continue to apply a rule that promotes unnecessary litigation, creates a
potential for extortion, results in waste, and rarely serves as a deterrent?
A. A Simple Rule
North Carolina courts have consistently held that a remedy at law is
inadequate to protect plaintiffs' property interest, and they grant injunctive
relief without great reluctance.47 0 Courts view a relatively slight benefit to
a plaintiff compared to a great hardship to a defendant as an insufficient
reason to deny a mandatory injunction. 4 7 1 The court's rationale is based on
the policy that land is unique, and protection of a landowner's rights is
more important than any financial loss to an encroacher if injunctive relief
is granted.4 72 Granting injunctive relief vindicates the plaintiff, punishes
the defendant, and serves as a deterrent to others.4 73
It is well-settled that an individual who encroaches on another's land
is a trespasser and has placed himself in a vulnerable position.4 74 Whether
his actions are innocent, negligent, or intentional, the defendant is still
guilty of invading the property interest of another individual. A mandatory
injunction punishes the defendant regardless of his intent or lack thereof to
take the plaintiffs land. 475 However, is justice served by applying the same
standard to one who innocently encroaches on his neighbor's land and one
who encroaches intentionally? 476 The innocent encroacher will likely not
repeat his mistake because he did not intend to take property that was not
468. See Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Williams, 346
S.E.2d 665.
469. See cases cited supra note 425.
470. See supra Part IV.
471. See Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 665. In Williams, the court found that the defendant
would have to remove the corner of a two-story apartment building, rendering the structure
unusable, and plaintiffs benefit would be enjoyment of the use of one square foot of
unusable property. Id. The court granted a mandatory injunction to compel removal of the
structure. Id.
472. See Adjoining Landowners, supra note 26, § 120.
473. Keeton & Morris, supra note 178.
474. See supra Section III.A.
475. See 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 142 (2004).
476. Compare Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 666 (where the defendant innocently encroached
on eleven inches of unusable creek bed), with Bunn Lake Prop. Owner's Ass'n v. Setzer,
560 S.E.2d 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (where the defendant continued to expand his dock
and boat house even after he was told the structures encroached upon plaintiffs creek bed
and violated the terms of an easement).
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his. Therefore, an injunction to compel removal fails to deter him or others
in his position.
In a court of equity, the plaintiff must show he will suffer irreparable
injury if the court denies injunctive relief.47 A plaintiff easily meets this
burden because a "given piece of property is considered to be unique, and
its loss is always an irreparable injury." 4 78 The court's inquiry, however,
should not stop with the finding of irreparable injury.479 It should proceed
to balance the hardships between the parties to determine whether an
injunction will issue.480
In North Carolina, the inquiry begins and ends with the threshold
question. If a plaintiff establishes an encroachment and continuing
trespass, then irreparable harm exists, a remedy at law is insufficient, and
the law entitles a plaintiff to removal of the encroachment. 481' The rule is
simple, but sometimes simple rules create complex problems. Application
of the relative hardship doctrine would ameliorate these problems.
B. Problems Created by the Rule
1. Promotion of Unnecessary Litigation
When a court consistently follows precedent, it is a predictor of how
courts will decide later cases with similar facts. In the case of an
encroachment, Bishop482 sets the precedent. If the court finds an
encroachment exists, the plaintiff is entitled to a mandatory injunction to
compel removal as a matter of law.483 The knowledge that a mandatory
injunction is a given result in an encroachment case has the potential for
promoting unnecessary litigation. If a landowner builds a structure that
encroaches mere inches onto his neighbor's land, the neighbor is
automatically in a superior bargaining position. The neighbor knows that
the threat of an injunction places him in a position to demand an exorbitant
price if the landowner wants the structure to remain intact. If the
landowner refuses to pay the price, the neighbor will bring an action asking
the court to compel the landowner to remove his structure. This places the
477. See Henry, supra note 45, at 334-35.
478. AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 21 P.3d 24, 27 (N.M. 2001) (quoting United Church of
the Med. Ctr. v. Med. Ctr. Comm'n, 689 F.2d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 1982)).
479. See id.
480. Id. The first part of the AMKCO test is a threshold question. If the first part of the
test is satisfied, then the court must address the second part of the test, which requires
applying the relative hardship doctrine.
481. See, e.g., Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
482. Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 305 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
483. See, e.g., id.
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neighbor in an even stronger bargaining position and will no doubt lead to
an appeal by the landowner.4 84 Generally, the amount of land involved is
very little and the benefit from removal of the structure to the plaintiff is
minimal. However, if courts were to level the playing field by actually
considering the relative hardship doctrine, the neighbor might not be so
eager to bring an action against the landowner. Greed and power are a
lethal mix in encroachment cases. If courts remove both from the equation,
then maybe the parties would be willing to sit down and negotiate an
equitable outcome.
Theoretically, the result in Williams v. South & South Rentals, Inc. 485
would have been more equitable if both parties had been willing to
negotiate a solution.4 86 The defendant made an innocent mistake when he
encroached approximately one foot onto plaintiffs land.4 87 The parties
would have avoided a lawsuit if the plaintiff had been willing to negotiate a
fair price for the land. However, greed trumped common sense in this case.
In a bizarre turn of events, the plaintiff in McCoy v. Peach488 made an
unwise decision when seeking to force defendant to sell and convey a strip
of property to plaintiff on which plaintiff had encroached.48 9 Evidently, the
plaintiff felt threatened by defendant's potential action for removal of the
structures. In a preemptive move, plaintiff brought an action under the
doctrine of betterments. Plaintiffs complaint prayed that if the court
would not force defendant to sell her the strip of land, and defendant
elected to have the structures removed, she wanted the court to order
defendant to compensate her for the cost of removal and rebuilding. 4 90 The
court dismissed the case, and plaintiff appealed. If the plaintiff in this case
had received proper advice, the case would never have resulted in a
lawsuit, much less an appeal. There is no indication the defendant in this
case was unwilling to negotiate with the plaintiff, but the threat of an
injunction to compel removal led to an unwise decision and unnecessary
litigation.
In Mathis v. Hoffman,491 an encroaching landowner was forced to
bring an action seeking declaratory judgment of the parties' rights and an
484. See AMKCO, 985 P.2d at 764 (providing plaintiffs with a particularly strong
bargaining position).
485. Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 665.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 666.
488. McCoy v. Peach, 251 S.E.2d 881 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
489. Id. at 881.
490. Id. at 882.
491. Mathis v. Hoffman, 711 S.E.2d 825 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
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injunction granting him the right to remove and relocate his fence.492
Defendant refused to allow plaintiffs access to her property and, in fact,
contacted local law enforcement and accused plaintiffs of trespassing when
they attempted to remove the fence.493 Defendant thought she was entitled
to an election of remedies-allowing plaintiffs to remove the encroachment
or being subject to a claim for unjust enrichment.4 94 Obviously, defendant
wanted to keep the fence on her property and was ill-advised in the matter.
The end result in this case was the solution plaintiffs initially proposed.
They offered to remove and relocate the fence, pay for the cost of removal,
and pay for any damages to defendant's land. This is exactly what the trial
court ordered; the court of appeals affirmed the decision but at a great cost
to plaintiffs. 495 The parties could have resolved this case between them and
the matter should never have gone to court.
The threat of a mandatory injunction may result in unnecessary
litigation. However, an even greater policy concern is the possibility of
extortion.
2. Possibility ofExtortion and Economic Waste
If an encroachment is minimal and the cost of removing the structure
is substantial, a court may force a defendant to buy plaintiffs land at a
price many times its worth rather than destroy the encroaching structure.496
Ethical and economic arguments disfavor this type of result.49 7 However,
in the heart of every human being is the potential for greed.
In encroachment cases, the defendant is at a great disadvantage. He
faces the real possibility of having to remove a substantial structure at
considerable cost. The plaintiff, on the other hand, is in a superior
bargaining position. All the plaintiff must do is determine how important it
is to the defendant to keep the building intact and how much the defendant
is willing to pay for the privilege. If the plaintiff makes an offer to sell the
property at an unreasonable price, defendant can either accept it or be
ordered by a court to remove his structure. Is this extortion? By any
standard, the answer is yes. This scenario is illustrated in Williams v. South
& South Rentals, Inc.49 8
492. Id. at 825.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 826.
495. Id.
496. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 818.
497. Id.
498. Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
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The possibility of extortion exists, but rarely does a court sanction
such action. However, the New Mexico Court of Appeals did exactly that
in dicta. 4 99 In the AMKCO500 case, the court stated that "if [plaintiffs] do
not wish to 'waste' their investment, then as this Court has said in the past
under somewhat analogous circumstances, 'nothing forbids [plaintiff] from
negotiating with [defendant] to waive its right to compel removal of the
building."',5 0  The court went on to state that "[t]he fact that a 'court
[ordered] injunction provides [defendant] with a very strong bargaining
position,' is no grounds for denying [defendant] the sole use and possession
of his own private property, particularly when that bargaining position is
simply a natural consequence of [plaintiffs] own mistake." 5 02 On appeal,
the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed
the trial court's decision with modification.50 3 The trial court had offered
defendant a choice of two remedies. 504 Defendant could elect to convey
title to the land in question for a fair market value or convey title to the
land for the replacement plot.5 0 5 The New Mexico Supreme Court added a
third choice, an easement to defendant for which an appropriate amount of
payment should not exceed the appraised value of the encroached land. 506
Although North Carolina courts do not sanction extortion, the
possibility always exists where encroachments are involved.5 0 7  The
potential for extortion exists when the defendant knows he must pay the
plaintiffs price or a court will force him to remove the structure by court
order. 0 s In either situation, the defendant who intentionally encroaches
receives his just reward. Yet, the defendant who accidentally crossed the
boundary line pays dearly for his mistake.
Often, a substantial building is the subject of an encroachment, and
removal of the structure may result in the structure being unusable for the
purpose a party built it.5 0 9 Therefore, the potential for extortion directly
relates to the threat of economic waste. If an encroachment can be
removed only by destroying a portion of the defendant's structure, but the
499. See supra text accompanying notes 274-94.
500. AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 985 P.2d 757 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
501. Id. at 764 (quoting Cafeteria Operators, L.P. v. Coronado-Santa Fe Assocs., 952
P.2d 435, 443 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998)).
502. Id. (quoting Cafeteria Operators, 952 P.2d at 443).
503. AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 21 P.3d 24, 26 (N.M. 2001).
504. AMKCO, 985 P.2d at 760.
505. Id.
506. AMKCO, 21 P.3d at 29.
507. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 816.
508. Id.
509. See MCCLNTOCK, supra note 139, § 140.
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harm to plaintiffs land is small, a mandatory injunction will result in
economic waste.510 Therefore, defendant may be forced to pay the
plaintiff s asking price rather than destroy a building which crossed an inch
or two onto plaintiffs' property. 1
Consider the economic waste that results in the cases previously
discussed where courts forced defendants to remove the encroachments that
were mistakenly created. In the Cornelius case, the defendants' house
encroached twenty-two feet onto the plaintiffs property-a fact she
learned three years after she purchased the land.5 12 The tax value of the
home in 2005 was $78,000, and the cost of moving and relocating the
house would cost between $10,000 and $15,000.51 3 In the Bishop case, a
house that was built partially on a vacant lot had to be removed at
defendants' cost.5 14 In the Williams case, the cost of removing the corner
of a two-story brick apartment building was at issue. And, in the
AMKCO case, the cost of removing a portion of a truck stop/convenience
store was $188,837 and would result in a $107,687 annual loss in
revenue. 5 16 In any of these situations, the defendant would no doubt be
willing to meet the plaintiff's asking price. In all but one of these cases, the
court discussed the relative hardship doctrine but applied it in only one, and
that is the only case where the court denied injunctive relief.5 1 7
3. Measure ofEconomic Consequences
A defendant's "[m]ere inconvenience and expense" are insufficient to
deny injunctive relief.5 " The harm to defendant to remove the structure
must be disproportionate to the harm caused by the encroachment. 5 19 This
raises the issue of how courts should measure the disparity of harm
between the parties. Stating that the harm must be disproportionate is a
vague standard with little guidance as to the weight given to the factors
considered. This also raises the issue of what is considered mere
510. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 816.
511. See id.
512. See Cornelius v. Corry, No. COAO6-107, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2135 (N.C. Ct.
App. Oct. 17, 2006) (where defendants and plaintiffs predecessor in title were unaware of
the encroachment for sixteen years).
513. Id. at *3.
514. See Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298, 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
515. See Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
516. AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 21 P.3d 24, 24-25 (N.M. 2001).
517. See id. at 30.
518. Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 669.
519. Id.; see also Cornelius v. Corry, No. COAO6-107, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2135
(N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2006); Young v. Lica, 576 S.E.2d 421 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
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inconvenience and expense. Is it based on the size of the encroachment,
the value of the land to the affected parties, or the cost and resulting
damage to remove the structure?
North Carolina courts have found the harm to defendant
disproportionate to plaintiff's injury on two occasions. These cases were
both decided prior to Bishop. One case involved a hospital driveway and
the other involved a massive pile of rocks.52 0 In Huskins v. Yancey
Hospital, Inc., the court focused on the use of the land by defendant and
determined that no benefit would result to plaintiffs but defendant would
suffer great hardship.5 2' Plaintiffs had no "present use for the land," but
defendant's continued use of the land was necessary to operate the
hospital.5 22 The court applied the relative hardship doctrine and reached a
just result.5 23 In Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co.,5 24 the courts focused
on the cost and time it would take defendants to remove the massive
amount of rocks.525 It would take defendants nine years to remove the
materials at a cost of $13,500,000.526 Both the North Carolina Court of
Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court required the trial court to
consider the relative hardship doctrine to reach an equitable result. 52 7 Thus,
it appears that the disparity of the harm between the parties triggers the
relative hardship doctrine, 528 but measure of the harm still remains vague.
The New Mexico Supreme Court focused on the use of the land in a
discussion of the disparity between the parties. 529 The court stated that the
size of an encroachment is an important factor but "it does not comprise the
entire inquiry." 53 0  The court went on to state, "it would be a stifled
understanding of 'hardship' that took into consideration only the area of
520. Huskins v. Yancey Hosp., Inc., 78 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. 1953). In Huskins, the
encroaching structure was a driveway used by ambulances at a hospital. Id. at 118.
Plaintiffs requested an interlocutory injunction and a mandatory injunction after a trial on
the merits. Id. Both were denied. Id. at 121-22. See also Clark v. Asheville Contracting
Co., 323 S.E.2d 765 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), modified and aff'd, 342 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. 1986)
(reversing an injunction granted at trial when plaintiff brought an action to compel
defendants to remove a massive pile of rocks which affected the enjoyment of their
property).
521. Huskins, 78 S.E.2d at 121-22.
522. Id. at 120.
523. Id.
524. Clark, 323 S.E.2d at 768.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 769.
528. See id.
529. AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 21 P.3d 24, 29 (N.M. 2001).
530. Id. (citing DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 816).
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land affected, but not the value of the land to the affected party." 531 In
some circumstances, an encroachment of mere inches may result in an
extreme hardship if the plaintiff shows the land encroached upon is of great
economic or personal value.532 On the other hand, an encroachment of
many feet may not result in extreme hardship to the plaintiff if he has no
use or value in the land except its market price.533
It seems that the area of the land affected, the use of the land, and the
economic consequences of removing an encroachment are all important
factors in determining whether the injury the defendant will suffer is
disproportionate to the injury plaintiff will suffer. This still does not
answer the question of how courts determine the disproportion and at what
point it triggers the relative hardship doctrine in North Carolina.
C. Leveling the Playing Field
North Carolina courts do not differentiate between a defendant who
mistakenly encroaches on a plaintiffs property and one who does so
intentionally.5 34 The courts have given lip service to the relative hardship
doctrine and the propriety of its application in deciding encroachment cases
but continue to rely on the precedent set in Bishop.535 Yes, there are
situations in which a remedy at law is inadequate. However, there are other
situations where courts can avoid issuing a mandatory injunction to compel
removal while still providing the plaintiff with an adequate substitute.
Courts issue injunctions at their discretion, not as a matter of right.5 36
The relative hardship doctrine provides a standard by which a court can
objectively decide the fate of the parties. It allows the court to consider the
size of the encroachment, the value of the land to the affected party, the
respective conduct of the parties, and the injury the defendant will suffer in
comparison to the benefit gained by the plaintiff. After considering these
factors, the court determines whether an injunction is proper or if it can
provide the plaintiff with an adequate remedy at law.
Application of the doctrine also eliminates the extremes of private
eminent domain, extortion, and economic waste. Courts will not allow a
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Corry, No. COAO6-107, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 2135 (N.C.
Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2006); Young v. Lica, 576 S.E.2d 421 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Williams v.
S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
535. Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); see Cornelius, 2006
N.C. App. LEXIS 2135, at *8; Young, 576 S.E.2d at 421; Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 665.
536. Injunctions, supra note 475.
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party to take the land of another simply because he is willing to pay for
it.5 37 Neither will courts sanction the extortion or economic waste that may
result from destroying a structure.53 8 The two principles are at variance
with each other, and it is for this reason most courts seek resolution by
balancing the hardships and equities of the parties.539
Since a mandatory injunction can be harsh, and one who creates an
encroachment in good faith may not deserve such punishment, a mandatory
injunction to compel removal may be imprudent if there is another remedy
that can adequately protect property rights. 54 0  Therefore, a court in its
equitable discretion may adapt relief based on the equities. 54 1
Courts have traditionally considered the economic cost of an
injunction to the defendant compared to the damages suffered by the
plaintiff under the relative hardship doctrine.542 If the total cost of
removing the structure, which includes the loss in value of the remaining
structure, was disproportionate to the harm caused to the plaintiff, then the
"disparity in economic consequences [was a] significant factor in
determining whether to issue the injunction." 5 4 3  Courts would deny an
injunction unless plaintiff provided evidence that his hardship or loss of
property rights was disproportionate if the encroachment was allowed to
remain.544  In Huskins v. Yancey Hospital, Inc.,5 the North Carolina
Supreme Court determined the hardship to defendant was disproportionate
537. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 816.
538. Id.
539. IM.
540. Keeton & Morris, supra note 178, at 413.
541. This balancing of equities has been described thusly:
In balancing the equities, the court is not limited to a determination of whether it
will grant or refuse the relief in its entirety . . it may adapt its relief so as to
preserve the interests of the parties as far as possible ....
Though some courts have apparently acted on the theory that the relief
plaintiff seeks must be wholly denied, or else defendant's interests entirely
destroyed by an absolute injunction, there should be no question, either theoretical
or practical, as to the power of the court to balance the equities in determining
whether it can mold its decree so as to avoid the infliction of unnecessary
hardship.
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 199, § 146 (footnotes omitted).
542. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 5.10(4), at 817.
543. IM.
544. IM.
545. Huskins v. Yancey Hosp., Inc., 78 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. 1953).
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to plaintiffs because defendant used the driveway as access to its hospital
and plaintiffs had no present use for the land.546
While an encroachment of only a few inches may cause significant
hardship to a plaintiff who attributes immeasurable value to those inches,
an encroachment of several feet may not cause significant hardship to a
plaintiff who only attributes market value to that portion of the land.547
Why, then, was the harm to defendant in Williams v. South & South
Rentals, Inc. 548 not found disproportionate, thus triggering the relative
hardship doctrine? The court's decision should have turned on the hardship
that the plaintiff would suffer in the absence of an injunction, not on the
advantage he would gain by issuing one.
One of the overriding reasons North Carolina courts do not consider
the relative hardship doctrine is the potential for "private eminent
domain." 54 9  However, "a defendant who accidently encroaches on his
neighbor's land is not technically vested with the power of eminent domain
by a court which refuses to issue a mandatory injunction."550  The
administration of remedies for a tort is completely different from
condemnation proceedings.55' If the defendant is not a quasi-public entity
and the court denies injunctive relief, it is because the result is incidental to
what the court determines to be an equitable solution to an unintended
situation.552 If the defendant's actions are deliberate and the defendant
relies on the court to force the plaintiff to sell against his will, the balance
of relative hardship weighs heavily in favor of the plaintiff.55 3
The intentional encroacher should suffer from the smart of a
mandatory injunction, and the remedy may very well serve as a deterrent to
other builders inclined to obtain property in this manner. However, if the
encroachment is innocent, the relative hardship doctrine is applied, and
injunctive relief is denied, there is no reason for the court to require "the
land pass in fee simple to the defendant if the plaintiff wishes to convey a
lesser interest. "554 For example, if the plaintiff wants his land back, the
546. Id. at 121-22 (denying plaintiffs' request for both interlocutory and mandatory
injunctions where the encroaching structure was a driveway used by ambulances at a
hospital).
547. Id.
548. Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
549. See Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); see also Williams,
346 S.E.2d at 665.
550. Keeton & Morris, supra note 178, at 413.
551. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Dobbs, Remedies for Trespass, supra note 7, at 367.
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judgment can give the defendant the right to keep his building on the land,
but with a provision that the land will revert to the plaintiff if the building
is destroyed.55 The bottom line is that courts can deny a mandatory
injunction and still protect property rights without resulting in "private
eminent domain."
The property rights of the parties will always be of major importance
to the courts. However, the scale tips heavily in favor of the plaintiffs
rights at the expense of the defendant. Courts must balance these rights so
that neither party suffers unjustly. The relative hardship doctrine provides
that balance and evens the playing field. "[T]here may be
situations . . . where sufficient public interest exists to make the right of
abatement at the instance of an individual improper, and defendant should
be permitted to demand that permanent damages be awarded." 556 The time
has come for North Carolina courts to put theory into practice and adopt the
relative hardship doctrine as the balancing standard in encroachment cases.
CONCLUSION
Is the law surrounding permanent encroachments what it should be?
If the encroachment is deliberate or negligent, the current law punishes the
wrongdoer and justly so. However, if the encroachment is innocent and the
encroacher had no intention of building on his neighbor's land, the current
North Carolina law is unjust. There should be an "exception to the general
rule favoring removal in 'rare' and 'exceptional' cases where an order of
removal would be, for various reasons, 'oppressive and inequitable.' 55 7
The courts should adopt the relative hardship doctrine and apply it in all
cases of encroachments. The result for the deliberate encroacher will be
the same as it is under the current law, but the result for the innocent
encroacher will be a just result for both parties.
The courts have been reluctant to accept change in this area of the law.
Since 1984, North Carolina courts hearing permanent encroachment cases
have followed the decision in Bishop v. Reinhold.5 5' The law is simple: A
court will order an encroacher to remove the encroaching structure.
However, the threat of a mandatory injunction creates undesired
problems-problems the relative hardship doctrine can eliminate. The
555. Id. See also AMKCO, Ltd. v. Welborn, 21 P.3d 24, 29 (N.M. 2001) (fashioning a
remedy in a case of first impression which, while novel, ended in a just result for both
parties).
556. Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
557. Brandao v. Docanto, 951 N.E.2d 979, 987 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (quoting Goulding
v. Cook, 661 N.E.2d 1322, 1324 n.3 (Mass. 1996)).
558. Bishop v. Reinhold, 311 S.E.2d 298 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
2017] 351
65
Weeks: The Law Is What It Is, But Is It Equitable: The Law of Encroachme
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
potential for extortion, economic waste, and unnecessary litigation is
significantly curtailed. And, punishment of innocent encroachers will
cease.
Perhaps change is on the horizon. North Carolina courts have
discussed the relative hardship doctrine as a standard for injunctive relief.
In fact, the North Carolina Supreme Court discussed the propriety of
applying the doctrine in encroachment cases, and a subsequent dissenting
opinion by the court of appeals supported the idea.559 Judge Parker, writing
for the majority in Williams v. South & South Rentals, Inc., stated:
We recognize that in today's economic environment with multi-investor
ownership of properties having substantial improvements, there may be
situations, other than the traditional quasi-public franchise, where sufficient
public interest exists to make the right of abatement at the instance of an
individual improper, and defendant should be permitted to demand that
permanent damages be awarded.560
Nevertheless, courts continue to follow the holding in Bishop
regardless of whether the encroachment was deliberate or an innocent
mistake. The law is what it is, but it is not what it should be. Now is the
time for change. It is time for North Carolina courts to balance the equities
between parties in permanent encroachment cases and pave the way for a
just outcome for both parties.
559. See Clark v. Asheville Contracting Co., 342 S.E.2d 832, 839 (N.C. 1986); see also
Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 669 (Webb, J., dissenting).
560. Williams, 346 S.E.2d at 669 (citing Rhodes v. City of Durham, 81 S.E. 938 (N.C.
1914); Dobbs, Substantive Law, supra note 25) (highlighting the possibility of permanent
damages in other cases before refusing to apply the relative hardship doctrine).
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